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DONALD J. BOUDREAUX' & A.C. PRITCHARD" 
This Article uses economic analysis to show how 
civil forfeiture creates perverse incentives for law enforce-
ment officials and encourages abuses. The Article then 
surveys the history of civil forfeiture and the Supreme 
Court :S forfeiture jurisprudence. Finding the Court :S 
jurisprudence incoherent, the Article proposes a constitu-
tional framework for civil forfeiture grounded in historical 
practice. Adopting that framework would go far toward 
reining in civil forfeiture :S abuses. 
Congress and federal law enforcement officials have increasingly 
employed civil forfeiture to combat the illegal drug trade. The 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (the 
"Drug Act") provides for the forfeiture of illegal narcotics and property 
used in manufacturing and distributing drugs.1 Since 1970, Congress 
has added two noteworthy items to the Drug Act's list of forfeitable 
property: (1) monies used in and proceeds from drug trafficking;2 and 
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I. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(4) (1994). 
2. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1994). 
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(2) real property.3 These additions have made civil forfeiture especially 
lucrative for law enforcement authorities because the law enforcement 
agency keeps the forfeiture proceeds.4 Moreover, civil forfeiture carries 
an important procedural advantage over the criminal law. Rather than 
holding the government to the higher criminal standard of proof, 
"beyond a reasonable doubt," Congress has provided that the government 
need only prove that "probable cause" supports the forfeiture. 5 The 
combination of huge returns and a minimal burden of proof has led law 
enforcement authorities to escalate their use of civil forfeiture to an 
unprecedented level. 
Civil forfeiture, despite its long historical pedigree in enforcing 
revenue laws, sits uneasily between civil and criminal law, between 
taxation and prohibition. In this Article, we model civil forfeiture as a 
"sin tax" to analyze its sometimes conflicting goals: prohibition and 
revenue raising. We examine the economic incentives provided by civil 
forfeiture as a window into the question of why legislators and law 
enforcement officials have expended such enormous resources waging 
the war on drugs. Our analysis shows that discouraging drug use may 
be only a secondary goal of the war on drugs, and that revenue 
considerations determine the vigor with which law enforcement 
authorities attack the drug trade. We conclude that the judiciary should 
be skeptical of civil forfeiture and its importance to the war on drugs. 
We propose a constitutional framework, grounded both in economics and 
history, to limit forfeiture abuses. 
In Part I, we develop an economic model of civil forfeiture's role in 
the war on drugs. We rely on an economic approach to political 
behavior to analyze the incentives that shape the legal regime Congress 
has adopted to enforce drug prohibitions. We focus in particular on civil 
forfeiture's uneasy status as a form of quasi-sin tax in the twilight zone 
3. The Act also provided an "innocent owner" defense for the first time. See 
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(7) (1994). That provision, 
in relevant part states: 
(a) The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no 
property right shall exist in them: 
(7) All real property ... which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner 
or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this 
subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, except that no 
property shall be forfeited under this paragraph, to the extent of an interest of 
an owner, by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to have 
been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner. 
The Act also provided for criminal forfeiture in all felony drug cases. 21 U.S.C. § 853 
(1994). 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994). 
5. 19 u.s.c. § 1615 (1994). 
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between the ordinary taxation of legal goods and the outright prohibition 
of criminalized goods. We examine civil forfeiture to determine where 
its costs fall and benefits accrue. We first analyze politicians' choice 
between taxation and prohibition, and the incentives leading politicians 
to adopt a forfeiture regime. We then highlight forfeiture's incentives 
for law enforcement agents and prosecutors. We show how enforcement 
authorities maximizing rent-seeking opportunities in drug markets are 
likely to over-enforce drug laws. This over-enforcement of the drug 
laws necessarily impairs the enforcement of other criminal prohibitions, 
and indeed probably leads to more violence and property crimes. Civil 
forfeiture blends the ordinarily distinct sectors of civil and criminal law 
together with unfortunate consequences for criminal law enforcement. 
In Part II, we briefly sketch the history of forfeiture in England. We 
then tum to Congress's expansion of the use of civil forfeiture in this 
country, and the Supreme Court's response. Traditionally, the Court has 
deferred to Congress's use of civil forfeiture. In particular, the Court 
has sanctioned Congress's abandonment of the common law requirement 
that the government first obtain a criminal conviction before obtaining 
real property through forfeiture. In tum, Congress has relied on the 
Court's deference by enacting civil forfeiture provisions going well 
beyond civil forfeiture's traditional domain. Specifically, Congress has 
exploited the freedom afforded by the Court's abandonment of common 
law requirements by adopting civil forfeiture as an additional sanction 
for criminal prohibitions. In several recent cases, however, the Court 
has backed away from its deferential posture, demonstrating increasing 
skepticism toward Congress's use of civil forfeiture. 
In Part III, we evaluate the Court's response to the government's 
recent expansion of civil forfeiture. We find that response wanting. 
While the economic analysis presented in Part I supports constitutional 
checks on civil forfeiture, the Court's response fails to put coherent 
limits on civil forfeiture because it relies on a variety of ad hoc exercises 
to check particular abuses. We offer an alternative constitutional 
framework, grounded in the common law and the historical function of 
civil forfeiture, to safeguard against civil forfeiture's unique abuses. Our 
rule is simple: the government must obtain a criminal conviction to 
obtain real property through forfeiture. Where Congress has 
criminalized primary conduct and the criminal actor is subject to in 
personam jurisdiction, all forfeiture proceedings for real property should 
require a prior criminal conviction. Thus, property owners would be 
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guaranteed the procedural safeguards that the Constitution affords 
criminal defendants. 
We conclude in Part IV with some observations about the Court's role 
in safeguarding constitutional traditions, and the risks of constitutional 
innovation. In our view, the history of civil forfeiture should give the 
Court pause when it is tempted to depart from long-established 
traditions. While the first departure may seem innocuous, government 
rent-seeking naturally flows into the precedential gaps created by those 
departures, paving the way for future abuses. The history of civil 
forfeiture shows that judges, like other government officials, cannot 
evade the law of unintended consequences. 
I. THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL FORFEITURE 
A. Civil Forfeiture and the Legislature 
Why do politicians criminalize goods demanded by many people? 
Economics answers that interest groups demand such statutes. If 
prohibition works (i.e., if commerce in the commodity is reduced or 
stopped altogether), politicians gain votes by eliminating goods intensely 
disliked by a sufficiently large block of voters. But even if prohibition 
is ineffective, voters may still be swayed by the posturing of politicians, 
who often stumble over each other in their efforts to "get tough on 
crime." Prohibition creates an instant crime problem as market 
participants attempt to evade the prohibition. Politicians milk votes and 
contributions by purporting to solve the problem by spending more on 
police and prisons. 
Political benefits from prohibition, however, are never free. When 
prohibition works, politicians suffer a real cost: outlawed goods yield 
no tax revenues. Thus, legislators have fewer resources to (re)distribute 
in ways that enhance their re-election chances. Ineffective prohibition 
also imposes costs on politicians. Legislators find it both difficult and 
politically embarrassing to tax goods whose circulation has been made 
illegal. If the prohibited commodity continues to be distributed, and 
politicians collect tax revenues from that distribution, voters may 
question the politicians' resolve in enforcing the prohibition. 6 In short, 
legislators feel the pain of foregone tax revenues when they consider 
prohibiting certain substances, and as a result, generally avoid outright 
prohibition. Legislators will outlaw only those commodities intensely 
6. Moreover, there are now constitutional bounds on the amount of such taxes. 
See Department of Revenue of Mont. v, Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). 
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disliked by large numbers of voters, for only those commodities will 
yield political benefits outweighing the foregone revenues.7 
Civil forfeiture frees politicians from this political constraint on 
prohibition. Forfeiture surreptitiously taxes formally prohibited 
substances. It permits seizure of contraband, and more importantly, 
seizure of valuable items used as "instrumentalities" in distributing 
contraband. Many instrumentalities are perfectly legal goods, such as 
automobiles used to transport marijuana. The government retains the 
proceeds when it liquidates seized items. In this way, government 
extracts revenues from the black market while still purporting to 
vigorously enforce prohibition. By varying the intensity of enforcement, 
government controls the amount of revenues extracted through civil 
forfeiture. Self-interested politicians will choose the enforcement level 
yielding the highest net revenues. Thus, civil forfeiture reduces the 
political cost of voting for prohibition. Politicians receive kudos by 
voting for prohibition, without sacrificing tax revenues ordinarily 
extracted from legal markets.8 Therefore, politicians face lower costs 
by voting to prohibit disfavored substances, which leads to more formal 
prohibitions. 
Civil forfeiture poses additional problems as a tax. These problems 
stem from the methods used to collect these taxes and the political 
effects on the government agencies that receive them. Specifically: 
• law enforcement agencies keep the proceeds from civil forfei-
tures;9 
• civil forfeiture proceeds are collected from only a small and 
politically unorganized subgroup of the population; 10 and 
7. Congress repealed alcohol prohibition in 1933 during the fiscal crisis of the 
Great Depression. This repeal occurred---and occurred when it did-because the 
Depression substantially reduced incomes (and, hence, income tax revenues). Congress 
was desperate for taxes available from legally sold liquor. See Donald J. Boudreaux & 
A.C. Pritchard, The Price of Prohibition, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. I (1994). 
8. Consequently, government gains a stake in the formally prohibited 
industry-an industry which, in the case of drugs, supplies hundreds of millions of 
dollars annually in revenue to government. In I 992 alone, federal civil forfeitures were 
worth approximately $900 million. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl. 4.43 (1992). 
9. See discussion infra part J.B. 
I 0. See infra note 14 and accompanying text. 
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• constitutional protections against government abuses are too often 
ignored in the civil forfeiture context. 11 
Because law enforcement agencies retain the proceeds extracted 
through civil forfeiture, members of these agencies coalesce into an 
interest group favoring, and lobbying for, civil forfeiture statutes (as well 
as their attendant prohibitions). Law enforcement officials campaign to 
expand the reach of prohibition and fight to minimize constitutional and 
statutory restraints on the use of forfeiture. 12 
Legislators benefit from civil forfeiture in two ways: ( 1) civil 
forfeiture frees up funds that would otherwise have gone to law 
enforcement agencies; and (2) civil forfeiture increases the cost of 
prohibited substances, thus fostering more violence in the outlawed 
industry. Politicians exploit this violence to expand government power, 
notwithstanding their role in fostering the very criminal activity that they 
rail against. They pedal ever more draconian criminal sanctions to 
voters as solutions to the problem of increased crime. 
Civil forfeiture also taxes in a random fashion. Civil forfeiture 
initially may appear to be a carefully targeted "user fee" that imposes a 
larger share of the fiscal burden on criminals. Appearances, however, 
deceive here. Civil forfeiture allows government to confiscate assets 
without abiding by constitutional restrictions designed to protect innocent 
citizens from over-vigorous prosecution of criminal laws. Civil 
forfeiture would impose a greater burden on criminals if the government 
were required to prove that property owners in fact had engaged in 
criminal conduct, but the procedures used afford no such assurance. For 
example, law enforcement agencies need only show probable cause for 
suspicion of illegal use to seize property; to retrieve the property, the 
owner must prove his or her innocence. 13 The government's burden of 
11. See infra part III. 
12. See Bruce L. Benson et al., Police Bureaucracies, Their Incentives, and the 
War on Drugs, 83 PuB. CHOICE 21 (1995). An agency's quest for forfeiture proceeds 
(in addition to concern for personal security) may help explain support by law 
enforcement agencies for gun control and, particularly, bans on assault weapons: heavily 
armed drug dealers can better protect their properties from government officials. But 
this speculation may be inaccurate. If gun control reduces the drug dealer's armories, 
the profitability of dealing drugs may decline because turf protection would be more 
costly. In tum, reduced drug-crime profitability might reduce the aggregate value of 
seizable assets. Alternatively, law enforcement agencies may support gun control 
because voters regard guns as substitutes for police protection services. By reducing the 
number of guns possessed by law-abiding citizens, the demand for police services 
increases, especially if gun control reduces gun possession by criminals proportionately 
less than gun possession by noncriminals. 
13. United States v. 900 Rio Vista Blvd., 803 F.2d 625, 629 (11th Cir. 1986) 
("Once the government demonstrates that probable cause exists, the burden of proof in 
a civil forfeiture proceeding shifts to the [ owner J to establish by a preponderance of the 
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proof is slight relative to the burden in a criminal prosecution. In a 
criminal case, the accused enjoys a presumption of innocence and can 
be convicted and punished only if the government proves beyond a 
reasonable doubt-to the satisfaction of a jury-that he has committed 
a crime. Thus, the government can more readily confiscate properties 
under civil forfeiture than it can convict people of criminal offenses. 
Minimal procedures inevitably lead to erroneous determinations. Civil 
forfeiture, by eliminating procedural safeguards, assures that too many 
innocent people will be burdened by taxes not shared by their fellow 
citizens. Criminal procedures exist not to make life easier for criminals, 
but to reduce government error in punishing noncriminals to a tolerable 
level. Civil forfeiture causes too many innocent people to have their 
properties seized and converted to government revenues, while similarly 
situated (i.e., equally innocent) people escape this tax. 
The random manner in which the government levies civil forfeiture 
taxes hides a part of the cost of the war on drugs from taxpayer scrutiny. 
A disproportionate share of these costs are foisted upon owners of 
property that law enforcement agencies suspect was used in drug 
trafficking. This group is politically unorganized and, hence, cannot 
adequately defend itself against more cohesively organized lobbies, such 
as law enforcement agencies, who clamor for liberalized civil forfeiture. 
Property owners at risk of forfeiture remain unorganized because they 
cannot identify themselves as members of the affected group before 
having their properties forfeited. The potential forfeiture of property is 
typically a one-time, low-probability occurrence for each property owner. 
Thus, they have little incentive to form or to join lobbying groups to 
press for the repeal or reform of civil forfeiture statutes. 14 
The proceeds from civil forfeiture thus partially relieve the general 
body of taxpayers from the burden of paying taxes for the public good 
of law enforcement. 15 Because taxpayers do not feel the full cost of 
evidence that the property is not subject to forfeiture."). 
14. See generally A.C. Pritchard, Note, Government Promises and Due Process: 
An Economic Analysis of the "New Property," 77 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1069-74 (1991). 
15. As we discuss below, insofar as government is excused from the inconve-
nience of abiding by the Constitution, members of the subgroup bearing the burden of 
the civil forfeiture tax are not sufficiently likely to be criminals. In those cases, 
majoritarian outcomes are likely to trample the rights of politically weak groups, thus 
justifying constitutional restraints on government. The Bill of Rights protects accused 
criminals from government overreaching, discouraging baseless prosecutions of innocent 
85 
government, as they would if law enforcement was funded entirely by 
direct taxes, the result is excessively large government in general, and 
overly aggressive drug-law enforcement in particular. 16 
B. Civil Forfeiture and the Nonoptimality of Law Enforcement 
We showed above how civil forfeiture allows the legislature to exploit 
a revenue source partially hidden from taxpayers. In this section, we 
explore civil forfeiture's consequences for executive branch decisions, 
and in particular, the consequences of allowing law enforcement agencies 
to keep seizure proceeds. 
First, however, we must review some basic economics of law 
enforcement. Law enforcement, like other goods, is scarce. 17 Resourc-
es used to enforce criminal laws could be used to construct bridges and 
highways, educate children, or provide social services. Alternatively, 
taxes can be kept lower so that private citizens can allocate their 
resources through their own individual decisions. Thus, efforts to 
eliminate all criminal activity would not be socially worthwhile. After 
some point, the gains from using additional resources to police against 
crime--even heinous crimes such as murder and rape--become smaller 
than the gains available from using these same resources elsewhere. 
As with all economic choices, the optimal amount of law enforcement 
occurs when the marginal benefit to society from an additional unit of 
enforcement equals the marginal cost of the resources used to produce 
people. 
l 6. Much of the cost of civil forfeiture seizures ultimately falls on lessees. A 
landlord who knows civil forfeiture understands that he faces some positive chance of 
losing his property due to drug offenses committed by his tenants. This landlord will 
thus raise the rent. By transferring a portion of the cost of government to tenants, a 
form of "fiscal illusion" is created. Fiscal illusion is (rational) ignorance about the full 
costs of government. As the cost of government becomes more and more detached from 
explicit tax payments (e.g., by being hidden in higher rental rates), fiscal illusion 
increases. Larger than optimal government is the consequence. See DENNIS C. 
MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE Il 342 (1989). Mueller states: 
Id. 
The fiscal illusion explanation for government size assumes that citizens 
measure the size of government by the size of their tax bill. To bring about 
an increase in government size, for which citizens are not willing to pay 
voluntarily, the legislative-executive entities must increase the citizens' tax 
burden in such a way that the citizens are unaware that they are paying more 
in taxes. 
17. See Morgan 0. Reynolds, The Economics of Criminal Activity, in THE 
ECONOMICS OF CRJME 24, 45 (Ralph Andreano & John J. Siegfried, eds., 1980) ("[l]f 
all crime could be prevented at zero cost, it would pay to stop all crime. But crime 
prevention, as we well know, consumes valuable resources, so that it only pays to 
expand the law enforcement industry to the point where the value of the additional harm 
prevented is equal in value to the resources consumed."). 
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that additional enforcement. And what is true for law enforcement in 
general also holds for choices among alternative areas of law enforce-
ment. Each type of crime fighting entails costs. Devoting more crime-
fighting resources to apprehending murderers means that fewer resources 
are available to police against vice offenses and other illegal activities, 
and vice versa. 1 
Figure 1 (following page) depicts the costs and benefits of enforcing 
drug prohibition. In the top panel, the horizontal axis measures the 
quantity of drug-law enforcement, while the vertical axis shows the 
dollar value of the costs and benefits of such enforcement. The marginal 
benefit curve (MB) shows the gains to society of each additional unit of 
drug-crime enforcement; the marginal cost curve (MC) shows the costs 
of those additional units of enforcement. Enforcement beyond E* is 
excessive because the benefits from further drug crime reductions are 
worth less than the goods and services thereby sacrificed. Similarly, 
enforcement less than E* is suboptimal because the gains from additional 
enforcement then exceed the costs. Therefore, any institutional 
arrangement affecting law enforcement should be assessed by how likely 
it is to encourage the optimal amount of enforcement. By giving law 
enforcement officials a disproportionate stake in drug-crime enforcement, 
civil forfeiture creates a powerful incentive for law enforcement agents 
to exceed the optimal, E*, amount of drug-crime enforcement. 
The lower panel of Figure 1 shows civil forfeiture revenues that law 
enforcement agents retain as funds for their agencies. 19 These revenues 
can be depicted using the familiar "Laffer curve," which shows the 
relationship between tax rates and tax receipts.20 If the agency engages 
in no drug-crime enforcement, it will gain no revenues from drug-related 
civil forfeiture (point 0). At the other extreme, if the agency enforces 
drug laws so vigorously as to eliminate illegal drug operations, civil 
18. See Benson et al., supra note 12 (showing that increased drug law 
enforcement reduces police efforts to thwart non-drug violent and property crimes, 
resulting in an increase in these latter crimes). See also Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: 
Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593 (1994). 
19. Empirical studies of civil forfeiture's effect upon the size of an enforcement 
agency's budget indicate that forfeitures "have a significant positive impact on non-
capital expenditures by police agencies." Civil forfeiture increases the discretionary 
budgets of law enforcement bureaus. See Benson et al., supra note 12, at 22. 
20. See James D. Gwartney, Supply-Side Economics, in THE FORTUNE 
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forfeiture revenues also will be zero. With no drug crime, there is no 
opportunity for drug-related civil forfeitures (point B). Between points 
0 and B, however, civil forfeiture revenues are positive. Civil forfeiture 
revenues increase as drug-crime enforcement expands from no enforce-
ment toward greater enforcement. After some point, however, greater 
enforcement reduces drug trafficking to such an extent that the dollar 
amounts available from seizures also will be reduced. 
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Revenues from seizures are maximized at EF. EF is the 'optimal' level 
of enforcement for law enforcement agencies allowed to keep proceeds 
from civil forfeiture seizures. Law enforcement agencies will determine 
the intensity of their drug enforcement efforts------and, by necessary 
implication, the intensity of their efforts to enforce laws against non-drug 
crimes---by how such efforts affect their civil forfeiture revenues. Thus, 
revenue effects of drug crime enforcement, rather than social welfare 
consequences, will determine the allocation of police efforts attacking 
various kinds of criminal behaviors. 
No necessary correlation exists between EF (agency-revenue maximiz-
ing) and E' (social optimum). EF could be to the right or to the left of 
E'; only by chance will EF fall at E'. Allowing law enforcement 
agencies to retain proceeds from civil forfeitures affords agencies 
discretion over their budgets. As a consequence, agencies produce either 
sub- or supra-optimal drug enforcement, leaving society worse off. 
The alternative to giving an agency discretion over its budget is to 
reserve that discretion exclusively for the legislature. When a legislature 
determines an entire budget for a law enforcement agency, that 
legislature, in effect, chooses a quantity of law enforcement. With its 
budget set by a legislature, the law enforcement agency then allocates its 
monies among the different categories of crime fighting. In this 
scenario, no one type of crime has a 'revenue advantage' over others in 
attracting law enforcement resources.21 The heads of law enforcement 
agencies will thus make more rational enforcement decisions. 
The legislature is the most appropriate branch of government to 
determine the law enforcement budget because it confronts many 
constituencies vying for public funds. Therefore, legislatures are better 
positioned than a specialized bureaucracy to determine if an additional 
dollar of public revenue should be used for law enforcement, schooling, 
or social welfare programs.22 To be sure, Public Choice23 economics 
21. Although without forfeiture, drug-law enforcement would have no revenue 
advantage over other law enforcement activities, drug arrests and seizures may provide 
more visible evidence of bureaucratic output than, for example, a drop in the number of 
burglaries. But even if such a 'bureaucratic-output' bias exists, it is worse if 
enforcement agencies retain civil forfeiture proceeds. 
22. See Reynolds, supra note 17, at 45 ("through [the] political process, the 
community is deciding how much and what kinds of crime to have"). 
23. "Public Choice" refers to the use of economic analysis to explain political 
institutions and outcomes. 
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indicates that legislatures are unlikely to tax, spend, and regulate in ways 
that maximize society's well being.24 Even so, legislatures should still 
allocate civil forfeiture proceeds more efficiently than law enforcement 
bureaucrats. 25 
Furthermore, we believe that drug laws are inefficiently over-enforced. 
Over-enforcement results from the victimless nature of drug use.26 The 
crime consists of a transaction between willing sellers and buyers. 
Americans, however, seem to prefer effective enforcement of laws 
24. See Gordon Tullock, Problems of Majority Voting, 67 J. POL. ECON. 571,579 
( 1959) ("[T]he system of majority voting is not by any means an optimal method of 
allocating resources."). See also DWIGHT R. LEE & RICHARD B. MCKENZIE, 
REGULATING GOVERNMENT (1987); JAMES M. BUCHANAN & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, 
EDS., THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II (1984); ROBERT E. MCCORMICK & ROBERT 
D. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION, AND THE ECONOMY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
INTEREST-GROUP THEORY OF GoVERNMENT (1981). 
25. See Roger D. Congleton & Robert D. Tollison, The Political Economy of 
Crime, IO (Nov. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors) ("[l]t is 
unlikely that law enforcement agencies would be directly responsive to the wishes of 
voters. . . . [T]he allocation of enforcement activity which maximizes police budgets 
differs from that which minimizes the net cost of crime to voters."). See also James C. 
Miller III et al., A Note on Centralized Regulatory Review, 43 PUB. CHOICE 83 (1984) 
("[J]fregulatory administration is decentralized, with rules issued piecemeal by a variety 
of independent agencies, then concentrated interests will typically be more successful in 
inducing regulators to fashion their decisions to benefit them. In contrast, a centralized 
review process makes this outcome less likely."). Centralization of policymaking 
reduces public decision-making bias because "centralization swns the individual welfare 
losses created by the regulatory bodies subject to its jurisdiction." Id. at 86. A 
legislature is a more centralized evaluator of law enforcement policy. 
26. Characterizing drug use as a victimless crime can be challenged. Critics 
typically point to families and friends rendered distraught by drug abuse, lost 
productivity, and increased burdens on the health care system. While we do not deny 
that drug abuse causes genuine and often expensive tragedies, it remains, in our view, 
a victimless crime. Drug use is victimless in the sense that no one is physically coerced, 
defrauded, or blackmailed into acting against his or her will, or involuntarily stripped of 
property. See Barnett, supra, note 18, at 262 l. This fact distinguishes drug use from 
crimes such as murder, rape, and burglary. 
Barnett persuasively argues that criminalizing noncoercive, nonfraudulent, and 
nonthieving activities actually increases social costs because victimless crimes have no 
complaining victims. Id. at 2621-25. Consequently, police must rely upon highly 
invasive techniques to detect such crimes, to apprehend their perpetrators, and to gather 
incriminating evidence. Constitutional protections are thereby imperiled. 
Criminalizing victimless behavior also dilutes valuable disapproving attitudes about 
criminal activity with victims. See STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S 
LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS l 06 ( 1993). Duke 
& Gross state: 
Id. 
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Criminalizing behavior that is commonly engaged in by a substantial segment 
of society inevitably debases the currency of criminal proscriptions. If a legal 
system declares that both drug use and robbery are reprehensible, it is not only 
making a moral statement about drug use, it is making a moral statement about 
robbery. 
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proscribing violence or fraud that harms nonconsenting parties, over a 
"war on drugs" where the transactions are consensual. In 1990, in the 
midst of drug war hysteria, the Drug Policy Foundation reported that 
more than one in three Americans (36%) supported drug legalization.27 
More recently, in January 1994, NBC Nightly News conducted a 
telephone call-in poll asking callers if drugs should be legalized. A 
majority (52.2%) favored legalization.28 As popular support for a law 
decreases, the social benefit of enforcing that law decreases. 
Enforcing such laws is also more expensive than policing violence and 
theft because victimless crimes lack victims willing to testify against 
lawbreakers. Thus, society gets more bang for its law enforcement buck 
when it shifts law enforcement efforts from pursuing perpetrators of 
victimless crimes to pursuing violators of personal and property 
rights.29 
In Figure I, the decreased social benefits of drug-crime enforcement 
are shown by a marginal benefit curve (MB') closer to the origin than 
MB; the higher marginal costs of victimless-crime enforcement are 
shown by a steeper marginal cost curve (MC'). The socially optimal 
level of enforcement falls as well (to E*). Naturally, EF is more likely 
to be to the right of E' as E" moves to the left. That is, the weaker the 
consensus for outlawing drug use, and the less willing victims are to 
testify against offenders, the more likely it is that enforcement agents 
will over-enforce legal prohibitions that yield personal benefits for the 
agents. If no widespread consensus exists for drug prohibition, then ci vii 
forfeiture leads to inefficient over-enforcement of drug laws. 
27. "The American People Talk About Drugs," poll conducted by the Drug Policy 
Foundation, Washington, D.C., April I 990. 
28. NBC Nightly News Phone Poll (NBC television broadcast, Jan. 4, I 994). Of 
those responding, 42,812 callers supported legalization, while 39,254 opposed it. 
Moreover, drug prohibitions are condemned by a number of prominent people. This 
number includes former Secretary of State George Schulze, Baltimore Mayor Kurt 
Schmoke, Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, and columnist William Buckley. DRUG 
LEGALIZATION: FOR AND AGAINST (Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Beran! eds., 1992). 
29. Gary S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and 
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 3 (1974) ("The society ... buys the 
amount of enforcement which it deems appropriate to the statute or rule: more will be 
bought if the statute serves a more valuable goal (protects us from murder rather than 
assault) and if a given increase in enforcement is less expensive."). 
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C. Civil Forfeiture and Violence 
Economic analysis teaches that penalties should match the seriousness 
of the crime.Jo Holding the probability of apprehension and conviction 
constant, perpetrators of more serious crimes should be punished more 
severely than perpetrators of less serious crimes. If criminal penalties 
are not matched to the increased social costliness of particular crimes, 
criminals who commit less serious offenses are inadequately deterred 
from committing more serious collateral crimes. If armed robbery and 
murder carried the same penalty, an armed robber would have no 
incentive not to kill his victims; the marginal cost of murder would be 
zero. More murder would result than under a more carefully calibrated 
penalty scheme.JI 
Civil forfeiture, as a penalty for drug trafficking, is not related to the 
seriousness of the crime. Forfeiture liability turns on the property's use 
in the crime, rather than on the crime's seriousness. As a result, small 
crimes can lead to large forfeitures. Because a drug dealer faces an 
equal risk of forfeiture if he uses his automobile to transport marijuana 
or crack cocaine, the civil forfeiture regime encourages a shift by the 
dealer from marijuana distribution to the more lucrative crack distribu-
tion. As drug dealers shift their marketing efforts to harder drugs, users 
are exposed to more expensive drugs with higher addiction rates. Crime 
rates rise both because users find it more difficult to control their actions 
while under the influence of these harder drugs, and because addiction 
is often financed with property crime. Similarly, because drug dealers 
stand to forfeit much of their property as a result of even the most minor 
drug offenses, the marginal cost of defending themselves and their 
property with violence during the commission of any drug crime is 
lower than it would be if losses increased with the seriousness of the 
offense.J2 Thus, while civil forfeiture deters some drug crimes, it has 
the perverse effect of encouraging nondrug crimes by drug users and sellers. 
30. See. e.g .• RlCHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 223-31 (4th ed. 
1992). 
31. Id. at 226 ("(O]ne cost of increasing the severity of punishment of a crime is 
to reduce the incentive to substitute that crime for a more serious one."). 
32. Colombia's Attorney General, Gustavo de Greiff, calls for drug legalization, 
primarily because of the link between prohibition and violence: "Our present approach 
offers criminals, large and small, a profit margin that no honest business ordinarily 
yields. In the process, we may be contributing to the generation of all the problems and 
vices that accompany drugs, i.e., violence, corruption, and a generalized disregard for 
law." Gustavo de Greiff, The Coke King Compromise: Colombia's Top Prosecutor on 
Rethinking the Drug War, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1994, at Cl, C4. See also DANIEL K. 
BENJAMIN & ROGER LEROY MILLER, UNDOING DRUGS 107-08 (1991). 
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In sum, economic analysis indicates that civil forfeiture leads to: (1) 
bigger government; (2) inefficient and overly aggressive enforcement of 
the drug laws; and (3) increased violence and theft. Therefore, 
economics suggests that courts should be skeptical of civil forfeiture's 
expansion. 
IL A BRIEF HISTORY OF FORFEITURE 
We turn now from economics to history. The history of civil 
forfeiture helps explain how law enforcement officials obtained such a 
dangerous weapon for fighting crime. After briefly reviewing pre-
Revolutionary War English precedent, we turn to civil forfeiture's 
use--and expansio~in America. 
A. English Practices 
English law provided three methods of forfeiture: (1) deodand, (2) 
attainder forfeitures, and (3) statutory forfeitures. 33 Traditionally, 
conviction of the property owner was necessary for all forfeitures save 
deodand. Beginning in the seventeenth century, certain stat-
utes---especially the Navigation Acts and revenue statutes--allowed for 
in rem forfeiture procedures without prior criminal conviction. 34 In 
rem procedures allowed the government to directly prosecute the 
offending property, naming the property itself as the defendant. The 
legal fiction was that the property itself, without human intervention, 
caused the harm or violated the law. Thus, no conviction of the property 
owner was required because legally the property owner was not being 
punished; only the property was found 'guilty.' 
33. See infra notes 34-51. 
34. See Michael Schecter, Note, Fear and Loathing and the Forfeiture Laws, 75 
CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1154 (I 990) ("The in rem proceeding ... developed in the 
seventeenth century .... ") 
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1. Deodand35 
A deodand is an instrument causing a person's death, e.g., a pistol or 
a runaway carriage. Forfeiture to the Crown under the common law of 
a deodand is the oldest in rem method of forfeiture.36 The deodand 
"may have served as an alternative to the blood feud of early jus-
tice-the instrument of death replacing the slayer's kin as the object of 
vengeance."37 In theory, the Crown used the funds from the liquidated 
deodand to pay for the funeral Mass of the deceased. In time, however, 
the Crown actually profited from deodand.38 
Some courts have been tempted to explain modern in rem forfeiture 
as evolving from deodand.39 Like modern American forfeiture statutes 
under which the government can proceed directly against offending 
objects (e.g., a yacht used to transport marijuana) as if these objects were 
culpable for the offense, the Crown proceeded directly against the 
deodand as if it were guilty of a tort or crime. There is little evidence, 
however, that modem forfeiture law descended from deodand, which was 
carefully limited by the English courts.4° First, and perhaps most 
obvious, property became deodand only if it caused a human's death. 
Second, "attempts to raise the analogy [ of forfeiture to deodand] were 
specifically rejected" by English courts.41 More recently, Grant 
Gilmore and Charles Black, in their treatise of admiralty, rejected Oliver 
Wendell Holmes's contention that deodand is the evolutionary ancestor 
35. The word "deodand" derives from the Latin Deo dandum, which means "to 
be given to God." Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663,681 n.16 
(I 974). 
36. See id. at 681 ( discussing the Biblical origins of deodand). 
37. James R. Maxeiner, Note, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at 
Last? 62 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 768, 771 (1977). 
38. Id. ("[D]eodands were one of many prerogatives of the English kings, 
providing a small but steady source of income."). 
39. See, e.g., Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 681-90. 
40. See Schecter, supra note 34, at 1154 ("Modem forfeiture law originated, 
independent of deodands, during England's seventeenth century maritime expansion."); 
see also Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 772 ("The only English authority cited as proof that 
deodand represents a general forfeiture principle is one sentence from St. Germain's 
Doctor & Student dialogues, published in 1530 .... But a careful reading ... does not 
support that conclusion." (footnotes omitted)). 
41. Maxeiner, supra, note 37, at 771. Maxeiner stated: 
In 1766, in a case before the Court of the Exchequer, the Crown argued that 
deodand represented a general principle of forfeiture law. Chief Baron Parker 
rejected the argument, citing Chief Justice Vaughn for the proposition that 
"goods as goods, cannot offend, forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the like, but 
[only] men whose goods they are." 
Id. at 771-72 (citing Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 
1766)) (footnotes omitted). 
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of modem forfeiture law.42 Finally, the superstition that inanimate 
objects can be culpable for harming humans has been discarded with the 
advance of science.43 
2. Attainder Forfeitures 
Attainder forfeiture was the largest class of forfeiture.44 Generally, 
under the law of attainder, the convicted felon's personal property was 
forfeited to the Crown, while his real property was forfeited to his lord. 
A conviction for treason, however, rendered all of the felon's property, 
personal and real, forfeitable to the Crown. No property was forfeited 
unless the owner of the property was first duly convicted of a criminal 
offense.45 The government proceeded against the property owner in 
personam. 
3. Statutory Forfeitures 
Although not the first English forfeiture statutes, the Navigation Acts 
of the mid-seventeenth century were the first to allow for in rem 
forfeiture. Prior to these Acts, "[i]f the owner was available, the 
forfeiture evidently was imposed only upon confession or adjudication 
of his guilt."46 The Navigation Acts were intended to strengthen 
England's naval prowess. By requiring that most imports and exports 
from England be carried in English ships, the Navigation Acts protected 
42. GRANT GILMORE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 590 
(2d ed. 1975). 
43. See generally Walter W. Hyde, The Prosecution and Punishment of Animals 
and Lifeless Things in the Middle Ages and Modem Times, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 696 
(1916). 
44. Stuart D. Kaplan, Note, The Forfeiture of Profits Under the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: Enabling Courts to Realize RICO 's 
Potential, 33 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 751 (1984). 
45. Blackstone justified forfeitures as an appropriate sanction for the property 
owner's violation of the social compact. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, I COMMENTARIES ON 
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 289 (1765). Blackstone stated: 
Id. 
The true reason and only substantial ground of any forfeiture for crimes 
consists in this; that all property is derived from society, being one of those 
civil rights which are conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree 
of natural freedom, which every man must sacrifice when he enters into social 
communities. 
46. Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 775. 
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the English maritime industry from competition.47 "Violation of the 
Acts resulted in forfeiture of both the illegally carried goods and the ship 
that transported them. The English courts construed these statutes so 
that the act of an individual seaman, undertaken without the knowledge 
of master or owner, could cause a forfeiture of the entire ship."48 
Given the importance of the maritime industry to British commerce, 
courts enforced the Acts strictly. Therefore, the Navigation Acts 
exposed certain parties to forfeiture even absent guilt. According to 
Chief Baron Parker of Exchequer, the Acts were: 
negative, absolute, and prohibitory; ... there is not a syllable that hints at the 
privity or consent of the master, mate or owners. 
The reason of penning this clause in these strong terms is to prevent as much 
as possible its being evaded, for if the privity or consent of the master, mate or 
owners, had been made necessary to the forfeiture, it would have opened a door 
for perpetual evasion, and the provisions of this excellent act for the increase 
of the navigation would have been defeated." 
Nevertheless, despite the "absolute" language of the Navigation Acts, the 
courts did not interpret them as imposing strict liability upon ship 
owners. If ship owners could not reasonably have known of the illegal 
uses, juries could acquit the vessel.5° For example, if the amount of 
contraband was so small that the owner or master could not have found 
it on board after a reasonable search, the ship was not forfeitable. 51 
B. Early American History 
The English law of forfeiture influenced American law while not 
strictly determining its course. The Constitution's framers did not 
outlaw forfeiture in response to its perceived abuses in England, but they 
did forbid bills of attainder,52 and they limited the penalty for treason 
by providing that "no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of 
Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."53 
These reforms abolished the worst abuses of forfeiture. The first 
47. See 1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE 
WEALTH OF NATIONS 464-65 (R.H. Campbell & A.S. Skinner, eds., Liberty Classics 
1981) (1776) ("As defence, however, is of much more importance than opulence, the act 
of navigation is, perhaps, the wisest of all the commercial regulations of England."). 
Smith, of course, opposed the protectionist functions of the Acts. Id. 
48. Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 774 (footnotes omitted). 
49. Mitchell qui tam v. Torup, Parker 227, 232-33, 145 Eng. Rep. 764 (Ex. 1766). 
50. Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 775 ("Thus, under the Navigation Acts, forfeiture 
of a ship carrying contraband was required only if the owner or his carefully chosen 
master was implicated or negligent."). 
51. Id. n.44. 
52. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. 
53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2. 
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Congress: ( l) adopted civil forfeiture to aid in the collection of customs 
revenues;54 and (2) abolished criminal forfeiture. 55 
In a series of early cases, the Supreme Court laid the legal foundation 
for current forfeiture practice. The Court adopted English in rem 
forfeiture procedures in rejecting challenges to the forfeiture laws. The 
early Court held that (1) forfeiture proceedings were civil rather than 
criminal, and that no jury was required because the proceedings arose 
under the admiralty jurisdiction;56 (2) goods could be forfeited upon a 
showing of probable cause of illegal importation;57 (3) the forfeiture 
"related back," vesting title in the government at the time of the 
offense;58 (4) the claimant, rather than the government, bore the burden 
of proof;59 (5) no criminal conviction was required for a forfeiture for 
acts of piracy;60 and (6) the property owner's innocence was no 
defense.61 Consistent with the in rem fiction that the "guilty" property 
was the defendant, the Court also held that actual seizure of the ship was 
required for a court to exercise jurisdiction, and that jurisdiction was lost 
if the vessel departed the court's territorial jurisdiction.62 
54. Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, I Stat. 145 (repealed 1799). 
55. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, I Stat. 112, 117, repealed by Pub. L. No. 
98-473, Tit. II,§ 212(a)(2), 98 Stat. 1987 (1984). 
56. United States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297, 301 (1796). Chief 
Justice Marshall later distinguished forfeiture of goods seized on land, which were to be 
tried to a jury under the common-law jurisdiction of the court. See The Sarah, 21 U.S. 
(8 Wheat.) 391, 394 (1823). 
57. Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 345 (1813). 
58. United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 398,405 (1814). 
59. The Langdon Cheves, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 103, 104 (1819); Locke, 11 U.S. at 
348. 
60. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) I, 14 (1827). 
61. United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 231-32 (1844). 
62. The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 289, 290-91 (1815). The Court adopted 
English in rem practice for forfeitures under the admiralty jurisdiction over two 
substantial historical objections. Arguing that the Seventh Amendment required a jury, 
former Attorney General Lee pointed out that "[ a ]II seizures [in England] for violation 
of the laws of revenue, trade, or navigation are tried by a jury in the court of exchequer 
according to the course of the common law." United States v. The Schooner Betsey and 
Charlotte, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 443,447 (1808). Lee also urged that "[i]t was one of our 
serious grievances, and of which we complained against Great Britain in our remon-
strances to the King, and in our addresses to the people of Great Britain, while we were 
colonies, that the jurisdiction of the courts of vice-admiralty was extended to cases of 
revenue." Id. at 448. Chief Justice Marshall rejected Lee's argument on the basis of La 
Vengeance, in which Lee had argued that a jury was required because the cause was 
criminal. Id. at 452 (citing La Vengeance, 3 U.S. at 299). Justice Chase suggested that 
Congress shared the Crown's motive in taking forfeiture from the jury: "The reason of 
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Most important of these rulings is Justice Story's opinion upholding 
a vessel's in rem forfeiture for piracy without a criminal conviction. He 
summarized common law forfeiture: 
It is well known;that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party 
forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly 
speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or at least a consequence, of the 
judgment of conviction. It is plain from this statement, that no right to the 
goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown by the mere 
commission of the offence; but the right attached only by the conviction of the 
offender. The necessary result was, that in every case where the crown sought 
to recover such goods and chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right by 
producing the record of the judgment of conviction. 63 
Justice Story went on, however, to distinguish common-law forfeitures 
from in rem forfeitures created by statute and seizures in admiralty. In 
those proceedings, forfeiture did not turn on the guilt of the offender; 
rather, "[t]he thing is here primarily considered as the offender ... .''64 
The forfeiture proceeding was independent of any criminal proceeding, 
and the challenged statute did not even provide for criminal punish-
ment. 65 Thus, "no personal conviction of the offender is necessary to 
enforce a forfeiture in rem in cases of this nature."66 
C. Civil Forfeiture and the Civil War 
The next series of forfeiture cases to reach the Court arose out of the 
Confiscation Acts, which authorized the seizure of property owned by 
Confederates and those aiding the rebellion.67 The Acts authorized in 
rem proceedings of both real and personal property, fashioned after the 
forfeiture proceedings for personal property such as vessels and 
the legislature for putting seizures of this kind on the admiralty side of the court was the 
great danger to the revenue if such cases should be left to the caprices of juries." Id. 
at 446 n.•. See also Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How,) 441,460 (1847) ("But there 
is no provision, as the constitution originally was, from which it can be inferred that 
civil causes in admiralty were to be tried by a jury, contrary to what the framers of the 
constitution knew was the mode of trial of issues of fact in the admiralty."), Justice 
Woodbury's dissent in Waring discusses at length the colonists' objections to the pre-
Revolution expansion of admiralty by the Crown. Id. at 467. Justice Story's typically 
learned opinion on circuit in De Lovio v. Boit, 7 F. Cas. 418 (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (No. 
3,776), relates the history of the admiralty jurisdiction. 
63. The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 15. 
66. Id. 
67. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 195, 12 Stat. 589; Act of August 6, 1861, ch. 60, 
12 Stat. 319. 
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smuggled goods.68 In Armstrong's Foundry, the Court recognized that 
the Acts "regarded the consent of the owner to the employment of his 
property in aid of the rebellion as an offence, and inflicted forfeiture as 
a penalty."69 Despite the Acts' penal nature, the Court nevertheless 
upheld them as an exercise of the war power over the claimant's 
objections that the Acts violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments,70 
citing the enactment of similar forfeiture provisions in the colonies/states 
during the Revolutionary War.71 The Court also held that due process 
did not require a prior criminal conviction before forfeiture. 72 
D. The Post-Bel/um Expansion of Civil Foifeiture 
The survival of the Confiscation Acts encouraged Congress to expand 
in rem forfeiture beyond its traditional domain-customs and admiral-
ty----to enforce revenue provisions unrelated to the maritime trade.73 
The landmark case upholding this break with tradition is Dobbins 's 
Distillery v. United States.74 In Dobbins 's Distillery, the Court upheld 
68. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. {I I Wall.) 331, 345 (1870); Union Ins. Co. v. 
United States, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 759, 764 (1867). 
69. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 766, 769 (1867) (holding that a presidential amnesty 
relieved an ex-Confederate ofa prior forfeiture). The Acts' legislative history reinforces 
its penal nature. See Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 786-87 (discussing Congress's 
intention to punish rebels). The Court construed the Acts narrowly to avoid offending 
the Corruption of Blood clause. See Bigelow v. Forrest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339, 352 
(1870). 
70. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268,305 (1871). The Court stated: 
Id. 
The Constitution confers upon Congress expressly power to declare war ... 
and make rules respecting captures on land and water. Upon the exercise of 
these powers no restrictions are imposed. Of course the power to declare war 
... includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy and to 
dispose of it at the will of the captor. 
71. Miller, 78 U.S. at 312. See, e.g., Kempe's Lessee v. Kennedy, 9 U.S. (5 
Cranch) I 73 (1809) (upholding forfeiture of real property under a New Jersey treason 
statute). The Miller decision provoked a heated dissent from Justice Field. In his view, 
legislation founded upon the municipal power of the government and directed 
against criminals . . . is subject to all the limitations prescribed by the 
Constitution for the protection of the citizen against hasty and indiscriminate 
accusation, and which insure to him, when accused, a speedy and public trial 
by a jury of his peers. 
78 U.S. at 315. 
72. See Tyler, 78 U.S. at 337-38, 346. 
73. See Act of July 20, 1868, ch. 186, 15 Stat. 125, 133. 
74. 96 U.S. 395 (1877). 
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the forfeiture of a distillery, and the real property upon which it stood, 
for liquor-tax violations. The owner had leased the property, and his 
tenant had defrauded the government of excise taxes due on the liquor 
distilled there.75 It was not necessary, the Court held, "that the owner 
of the property should have knowledge that the [tenant] was committing 
fraud on the public revenue, in order that the information of forfeiture 
should be maintained."76 The Court reasoned that the proceeding was 
civil in nature, and that any "conviction of the wrong-doer must be 
obtained, if at all, in another and wholly independent proceeding."77 
The Court justified its holding by citing The Palmyra.78 No precedent 
was cited, however, for the proposition that real property forfeiture, as 
opposed to the personal property traditionally forfeited in rem, could be 
accomplished without a prior criminal conviction. Nowhere in the 
decision does the Court indicate that it even considered whether real 
property was distinguishable from personal property. The Court simply 
affirmed the forfeiture despite the owner's lack of wrong-doing because 
"the offence . . . attached primarily to the distillery, and the real and 
personal property used in connection with the same, without any regard 
whatsoever to the personal misconduct or responsibility of the own-
er. "79 
Dobbins s Distillery did not end challenges to civil forfeiture. Faced 
with those challenges, the Court shied away from the full implications 
of forfeiture's "civil" label. In Coffey v. United States, the Court held 
that a prior acquittal of criminal tax evasion barred a subsequent civil 
forfeiture based on the same conduct.80 Later that same term, in Boyd 
v. United States, the Court held that the Fourth and Fifth Amendments 
barred the compulsory production of private documents in a forfeiture 
proceeding.81 The Court declared the proceedings "quasi-criminal," 
75. Id. at 396-97. 
76. Id. at 399. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 399-400. 
79. Id. at 401. The Court also affirmed the relation-back principle in the context 
of real property. United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 17 (1890) ("[T]he forfeiture 
constitutes a statutory transfer of the right to the United States at the time the offence 
is committed; and the condemnation, when obtained, relates back to that time, and 
avoids all intermediate sales and alienations, even to purchasers in good faith."). In a 
later case involving personal property forfeiture, the Court rejected the claimant's 
argument that the government could not seize property unless it proved its case beyond 
a reasonable doubt. Lilienthal's Tobacco v. United States, 97 U.S. 237, 266-68, 271-72 
(1878). The Court had earlier reaffirmed that where a seizure giving rise to a forfeiture 
was made on land, the claimant was entitled to a jury trial. Gamharts v. United States, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 162, 165 (1872). 
80. I 16 U.S. 436,442 (1886). 
81. I 16 U.S. 616 (1886). 
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because proceedings for "the forfeiture of a man's property by reasons 
of offences committed by him, though they may be civil in form, are in 
their nature criminal. "82 
These pronouncements spawned a series of constitutional challenges 
to civil forfeiture, but the Court narrowly cabined Boyd's "quasi-
criminal" rationale. The Court reaffirmed the traditional rule requiring 
no prior criminal conviction to forfeit unlawfully imported goods,83 and 
denied that Confrontation Clause rights attach in forfeiture proceed-
ings.84 The Court made no pretense of distinguishing Boyd; it simply 
announced that "[t]he principles announced in the Boyd case have no 
application whatever to the present case" because there was no claim of 
either unreasonable search and seizure or compelled self-incrimina-
tion.85 
This disdain for Boyd's reasoning did not bode well for future 
challenges to forfeiture. The Court later held that the trial judge could 
direct a verdict for the government in a forfeiture suit,86 and that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt was not required, even though the statute 
authorizing the penalty also made the same conduct a misdemeanor.87 
Finally, the Court breezily rejected the due process challenge of an 
innocent third-party claimant, holding a security interest in a car 
forfeited for transporting alcohol, who challenged in rem forfeiture: 88 
Congress interposes the care and responsibility of their owners in aid of the 
prohibitions of the law and its punitive provisions, by ascribing to the property 
a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong .... 
But whether the reason for [civil forfeiture] be artificial or real, it is too 
firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now 
displaced. 89 
82. Id. at 633-34. 
83. Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240 (1888). 
84. United States v. Zucker, 161 U.S. 475 (1896). 
85. Id. at 480. 
86. Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 112 (1909). 
87. United States v. Regan, 232 U.S. 37 (1914). The Court distinguished Boyd 
on the ground that the Fifth Amendment had a "broader scope" than did the Sixth. Id. 
at 50. 
88. J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 506, 509 
(1921). 
89. Id. at 510-11. After Prohibition's repeal, the Court stepped back from the 
rather daunting monitoring duties it had imposed on creditors. See United States v. One 
1936 Model Ford V-8 DeLuxe Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 236 (1939) ("The forfeiture acts 
... were intended for protection of the revenues, not to punish without fault."). 
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Apparently, civil forfeiture was too well embedded in tradition to be 
dislodged by mere appeals to fairness. 
E. Modern Civil Foifeiture Cases 
Constitutional challenges to forfeiture declined after Prohibition,90 but 
the modem Court has revisited civil forfeiture's constitutional status. In 
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, the Court held that the 
right against compelled self-incrimination provided a defense to the civil 
forfeiture of money used in illegal gambling, rejecting the government's 
argument that it was prosecuting the money, not the gambler.91 The 
Court reasoned: 
From the relevant constitutional standpoint there is no difference between a man 
who "forfeits" $8,674 because he has used the money in illegal gambling 
activities and a man who pays a "criminal fine" of $8,674 as a result of the 
same course of conduct. ... When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their 
entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon 
those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise.92 
The Court, however, quickly dispelled any notion that it would apply 
criminal procedures to civil forfeiture across the board. Two terms later, 
the Court rejected a double jeopardy challenge to the forfeiture of 
smuggled goods.93 The Court found the forfeiture remedial, because 
it "prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States, 
and . . . it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for 
90. The Court decided a number of forfeiture cases during Prohibition. The 
National Prohibition Act provided for forfeiture only after a criminal conviction, but 
Congress did not repeal the alcohol excise tax, or its broad forfeiture provisions. United 
States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321, 326-27, 332 (1926). The Court upheld the 
tax's forfeiture provisions, although there was "no way in which the tax could be ... 
paid." Id. at 327. A tax which was actually a penalty could not be obtained after a 
criminal conviction. United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931). But see 
Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 39 I (1938) (50% tax penalty is remedial and therefore 
no double jeopardy bar to civil collection proceeding following criminal acquittal). But 
forfeiture was not a penalty, because "[i]t is the property which is proceeded against, 
and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious 
instead of inanimate and insentient." Various Items of Personal Property v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 577,581 (1931). See also Helvering, 303 U.S. at 400 ("Forfeiture of 
goods ... [has J been recognized as enforceable by civil proceedings since the original 
revenue law of I 789. In spite of [its] comparative severity, [forfeiture has] been upheld 
against the contention that [it is] essentially criminal and subject to the procedural rules 
governing criminal prosecutions." (citations omitted)). 
91. 401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971). 
92. Id. at 718, 721-22. 
93. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (I 972) (per 
curiam). 
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violation of the inspection prov1s1ons and serves to reimburse the 
Government for investigation and enforcement expenses."94 
The next term brought an even more emphatic rejection of challenges 
to civil forfeiture. In Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., the 
Court upheld a yacht's forfeiture, resulting from the discovery of 
marijuana on board, over the lessor's objection that it was ignorant of 
the yacht's illegal use.95 The lessor claimed that the forfeiture violated 
due process and was a taking without just compensation. The Court 
offered three reasons for rejecting the lessor's claim to preseizure notice 
and a hearing: ( l) seizure permitted in rem jurisdiction, "thereby 
fostering the public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the 
property and in enforcing criminal sanctions";96 (2) preseizure notice 
might lead to the removal, concealment, or destruction of the property; 
and (3) the seizure was initiated by government officials rather than 
"self-interested private parties."97 The Court also rejected the takings 
claim, invoking the long history of civil and criminal forfeiture 
provisions, as well as the need to help enforce the criminal law. 
Forfeiture ensured that the conveyance would not be used again for 
illegal activity, "and ... impos[ed] an economic penalty, thereby 
rendering illegal behavior unprofitable."98 The owner's innocence was 
irrelevant, because the forfeiture would "induc[ e] them to exercise 
greater care in transferring possession of their property."99 The Court 
did not explain how the owners might have done so. 
F. Recent Cases 
More recently, the Court has revealed a heightened skepticism of civil 
forfeiture's role in the war on drugs. The government recently has 
94. Id. at 237. Coffey and Boyd were limited to their facts. Id. at 235 n.5, 236 
n.6. Coffey subsequently was overruled. United States v. One Assortment of 89 
Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361 (1984) ("[N]either collateral estoppel nor double jeopardy 
bars a civil, remedial forfeiture proceeding initiated following an acquittal on related 
criminal charges. To the extent that Coffey v. United States suggests otherwise, it is 
hereby disapproved."); see also United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,253 (1980) ("This 
Court has declined, however, to give full scope to the reasoning and dicta in Boyd . 






416 U.S. 663 (1974). 
Id. at 679. 
Id. 
Id. at 687. 
Id. at 688. 
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litigated four civil forfeiture cases arising under the Drug Act; it lost all 
four. 100 We focus on the last two cases. 101 
In Austin v. United States, the government sought civil forfeiture of 
Richard Austin's mobile home and auto body shop after he was 
convicted for distributing two ounces of cocaine from the shop, having 
brought the cocaine from his mobile home to consummate a prearranged 
sale. 102 The district court granted the government's summary judgment 
motion, rejecting Austin's argument that the forfeiture violated the 
Excessive Fines Clause, and the court of appeals "reluctantly" af-
firmed. io3 The Supreme Court granted Austin's certiorari petition.i 04 
The government urged that "any claim that the government's conduct 
in a civil proceeding is limited by ... the Excessive Fines Clause ... 
must fail unless the challenged governmental action, despite its label, 
would have been recognized as a criminal punishment at the time the 
Eighth Amendment was adopted."105 Arguing that civil forfeiture of 
real property was not criminal punishment, the government invoked the 
venerable traditions of deodand and the revenue laws which treated the 
100. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993); 
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993); United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 
113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993) (plurality opinion); Republic Nat'! Bank of Miami v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 554 (1992). In a fifth case, the Court rejected a First Amendment 
challenge to a RICO criminal forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a), but remanded to the lower 
court for consideration of the defendant's Excessive Fines challenge. Alexander v. 
United States, I I 3 S. Ct. 2766, 2769 (I 993). As this Article goes to print, two 
additional cases are pending before the Court. See infra notes 150, 153. 
IO I. In Republic Nat'/ Bank, the government argued that the court of appeals lost 
jurisdiction when the United States Marshal transferred the proceeds from the sale of the 
res to the Assets Forfeiture Fund. 113 S. Ct. at 557. The Court disagreed, limiting the 
rule of The Brig Ann requiring the seizure of the res, see supra note 62, to those cases 
in which the seizing party had abandoned its attachment prior to filing an action. 113 
S. Ct. at 559. The Court explained the rationale allowing jurisdiction on the basis of 
seizure: "The fictions of in rem forfeiture were developed primarily to expand the reach 
of the courts and to furnish remedies for aggrieved parties," and explained the limits of 
that rule: to ensure "enforceability of judgments, and fairness of notice to parties." Id. 
( citations omitted). 
In 92 Buena Vista Ave., the government argued that an allegedly innocent owner had 
no property right because title "related back" to vest in the government at the time of 
the purchase, which was made with drug trafficking proceeds. I I 3 S. Ct. at I 130. In 
the government's view, the proceeds had been forfeited prior to those transactions, and 
any subsequent transfer did not devest the government's title. Id. at 1134. The Court 
rejected this "absurdity" because "the Government's submission would effectively 
eliminate the innocent owner defense in almost every imaginable case." Id. at I 135 & 
n.18. The Court held that title did not vest in the government until judgment, and that 
claimants could therefore assert the statutory defenses. Id. at 1136. 
I 02. 113 S. Ct. at 2803. 
103. Id. 
104. 113 S. Ct. 1036. 
105. Brief for the United States at 16, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 
(1993) (No. 92-6073). 
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property as the offender. 106 The government, however, failed to cite 
any case before Dobbins s Distillery in which a court-English or 
American--treated real property as the offender. The following 
exchange occurred at oral argument: 
[Justice Scalia]: Mr. Estrada, historically-do you know the answer to this? 
Historically at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted, was there such a 
thing as in rem forfeiture of real property, or was it limited to ships and 
personal property? 
MR. ESTRADA: [T]here is no contemporary case that we've been able to 
find in which a specific issue was made of the fact. There is a case, Dobbins s 
Distillery, which is cited in our [brief], in which the claim was raised 
specifically that real property in that case could not be forfeited, and the Court 
dealt with real property in the case much as it had dealt with the claims of ships 
and the like without giving any indication whatsoever that the real estate, by 
virtue of bein§ that type of property interest, couldn't be forfeited under the 
common law. 1 7 
"[A]t the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted," real property could 
only have been forfeited as a criminal punishment. 108 
I 06. Id. at 18-24. 
107. Official Transcript at 26-27, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) 
(No. 92-6073). 
I 08. Justice Kennedy later distinguished the common law tradition relied on by the 
government: 
[Justice Kennedy]: But all that analysis, Mr. Estrada, proceeds from the line 
of cases that essentially began with forfeitures in the maritime area and 
forfeitures of certain kind of chattel. But isn't it true that at early common 
law, one of the benefits, at least to the nobles, of classifying certain crimes as 
felony was so that they could have forfeiture. Forfeiture was intricately bound 
up with the definition of crime at a very early English law, was it not? 
MR. ESTRADA: Well, I think-
[Justice Kennedy]: And didn't the Framers recognize that? 
MR. ESTRADA: There were two types of forfeiture at early common law, 
Justice Kennedy. One of them was the so-called forfeiture of estate, which 
really was in personam and really only came into play when the Government 
proved with a judgment of conviction that the person had, in fact, been 
convicted of a crime. 
The other type of forfeiture really didn't have anything to do with the crimes 
that were hurting the king's bench. It was in a completely different court 
system, the Court of the Exchequer, and that type of forfeiture, which is, in 
essence, what is at issue here, didn't partake of the rationale that you just gave 
I think. 
[Justice Kennedy]: It seems to me that the Framers were concerned that the 
criminal laws not be used to impose excessive punishments, and certainly in 
the early history of England, that was true with reference to forfeitures for 
felonies. 
105 
Apart from these vexing questions regarding the historical tradition of 
real property forfeiture, the government also labored to distinguish 
United States v. Halper. 109 The Court in Halper held that double 
jeopardy barred a proceeding to seek a civil penalty, disproportionate to 
any remedial end, subsequent to a criminal conviction. The government 
argued in Austin that the forfeiture of Austin's property served a broad 
remedial purpose: 
The drain on the public fisc attributable to the vastly increased law enforcement 
expenses that have accompanied the drug epidemic, and to the care, treatment, 
and rehabilitation of drug addiction and related problems is practically 
incalculable----and easily dwarfs the value of assets acquired by the government 
as a result of asset forfeitures. 110 
The Court unanimously reversed. 111 After surveying English and 
American forfeiture history, the Court found that "forfeiture generally 
and statutory in rem forfeiture in particular historically have been 
understood, at least in part, as punishment."112 The Court rejected the 
government's argument that forfeiture under the Drug Act was remedial, 
focusing on: (1) the Act's provisions protecting innocent owners; (2) 
Congress's choice "to tie forfeiture directly to the commission of drug 
offenses"; and (3) "the dramatic variations in the value of conveyances 
and real property forfeitable." 113 The Court concluded that forfeiture 
was a "'payment to a sovereign as punishment for some offense' ... 
MR. ESTRADA: Right, but it was not the same type of forfeiture that is at 
issue here, Justice Kennedy. If this were a case in which the forfeiture could 
only be had upon the conviction of a crime, we don't-we would not be here 
because we would concede that the essence of that sort of action is on the 
person. 
What we do have here is a statute that really doesn't need the criminal law 
other than to state a--other than to set a standard of conduct and, taking that 
as the standard of conduct, then says if your property has been used or is 
intended to be used for this purpose, then we will make sure that that harm 
doesn't come to pass by placing the property in the hands of someone who can 
give surety to society as a whole that these harms won't happen. And I think 
that's a very different type of forfeiture than the forfeiture that you have in 
mind, Justice Kennedy. 
Id. at 39-41 ( emphasis added). The authors are grateful to Miguel Estrada for 
identifying the justices posing the cited questions. Interview with Miguel A. Estrada, 
Assistant to the Solicitor General (Apr. I, 1994). 
109. 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
110. Brief for the United States at 30-31, Austin v. United States, I 13 S. Ct. 2801 
{1993) (No. 92-6073) (citations omitted). 
111. Austin, I 13 S. Ct. at 2812. 
112. Id. at 2810. 
113. Id. at 2810-12. 
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subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines 
Clause."114 
The Supreme Court addressed civil forfeiture only once during the 
following term. 115 Four years after James Daniel Good had been 
convicted, sentenced, and fined in a Hawaii state court for growing 
marijuana, the United States filed an in rem action to forfeit his house 
and the appurtenant four acres. 116 Based on an affidavit stating the 
facts underlying the state conviction, the magistrate judge issued an ex 
parte warrant to seize the property. 117 After the seizure, Good filed a 
claim for the property's return. 118 The district court entered a judg-
ment of forfeiture, but the court of appeals reversed, holding that the 
government violated due process when it seized Good's property without 
prior notice and hearing. 119 
The government argued that the Due Process Clause did not apply 
when seizing property for "law enforcement purposes," and that it only 
needed to comply with the Fourth Amendment. 120 The government 
reasoned that because the Fourth Amendment did not require an 
adversary hearing to establish probable cause to detain a criminal 
defendant pending trial, no adversary hearing was required to detain real 
property subject to forfeiture. 121 In the alternative, the government 
urged that due process did not require notice and a hearing before 
seizing property for forfeiture. 122 As in Austin, the government cited 
114. Id. at 2812 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 
265 (1989). 
115. See Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994) 
(expanding upon the Halper analysis in the context of taxation of illegal drugs). 
116. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 497 
( I 993). Although A. C. Pritchard was employed by the Office of the Solicitor General 
at the time Good was argued, the views expressed here are solely those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of Justice. 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 498. 
119. Id. 
120. Brief for the United States at 13, United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993) (No. 92-1180). 
121. Id. at 9 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119-22 (1975)). 
122. Id. at 10 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 
677 (I 974)). 
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no case prior to Dobbins s Distillery in which real property was forfeited 
in rem. 123 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, rejected the government's 
argument that the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to civil 
forfeitures excluded the application of the Due Process Clause. 124 He 
applied the balancing test of Matthews v. Eldridge125 to the facts of the 
case. Justice Kennedy found that: (1) Good had a substantial interest 
in his home; (2) the ex parte determination of probable cause posed a 
considerable risk of error; and (3) the government's asserted interests in 
taking control of the property---obtaining jurisdiction and preventing the 
loss or destruction of the property-were slight in the case of real 
property. 126 He distinguished Dobbins s Distillery and later cases on 
the ground that "executive urgency" required "'[t]he prompt payment 
of taxes. "'127 Because tax revenues were not implicated, due process 
required notice and hearing before seizing the house. 128 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor and Justice Thomas 
dissented. The Chief Justice characterized the distinction of Dobbins s 
Distillery as "novel," and pointed out that the majority's opinion called 
into question the government's long-established authority to collect taxes 
by summary procedures. 129 Justice O'Connor charged that "[t]he 
distinction the Court tries to draw between our precedents and this 
case---the only distinction it can draw-is that real property is somehow 
different than personal property for due process purposes. But that 
distinction has never been considered constitutionally relevant in our 
forfeiture cases."130 Justice O'Connor cited Dobbins s Distillery for 
the proposition that the government can summarily seize and forfeit real 
property used in a crime. 131 Justice Thomas's dissent was more 
guarded in its tone, recognizing that 
123. Id. at 18. The ACLU, as amicus, focused on civil forfeiture's expansion 
beyond its original domain of contraband and direct instrumentalities. Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of Hawaii in Support of 
Respondents at 3-IO. The ACLU urged that "civil in rem forfeiture is no longer 
grounded in its original remedial justification," and that "the government can no longer 
rely on the 'guilty property' fiction to obscure the punitive impact of forfeiture on 
individuals like Good." Id. at 10. In the ACLU's view, property owners were entitled 
to all relevant constitutional criminal procedures. Id. at 19. 
124. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 500. 
125. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
126. Good, 114 S. Ct. at 50 I. 
127. Id. at 504 (quoting Springer v. United States, l02 U.S. 586, 594 (1880)). 
128. Id. at 505. 
129. Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, C.J, concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
130. Id. at 511 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
131. Id. at 512. 
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[a] strong argument can be made ... that§ 881(a)(7) is so broad that it differs 
not only in degree, but in kind, from its historical antecedents .... Given that 
current practice under § 88l(a)(7) appears to be far removed from the legal 
fiction upon which the civil forfeiture doctrine is based, it may be neces-
sary-in an appropriate cas~o reevaluate our genera111 deferential approach to legislative judgments in this area of civil forfeiture. 13 
In Justice Thomas' view, however, Good did not provide an appropriate 
vehicle for reconsidering the Court's approach to civil forfeiture. Justice 
Thomas found the majority's distinction of Dobbins s Distillery "twice-
puzzling," as it was "somewhat odd that the ... Government's financial 
concerns might justifiably control the due process analysis" and "difficult 
to believe that the prompt collection of funds was more essential to the 
Government a century ago than it is today."133 
Ill. CIVIL FORFEITURE, THE COURT, AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The Constitution, with enforcement by Article Ill's independent 
judiciary, limits the agency costs that government actors can impose on 
the public. 134 Judicial independence protects judges from political 
pressures----such as those compelling legislators to enact ever more 
draconian laws against drug trafficking--and allows the judiciary to 
check the rent-seeking behavior endemic to the political branches. 135 
As shown in Part I, agency costs are particularly acute in the context of 
the war on drugs, especially given civil forfeiture's collateral conse-
quences in violence and property crime. In our view, civil forfeiture has 
more to do with rent-seeking by legislators and law enforcement officials 
than with eradicating drug use. In this Part, we discuss the judiciary's 
role in discouraging this rent-seeking. 
Drug Act forfeiture singles out certain individuals to bear the costs of 
law enforcement against illegal drug use. Imposing costs on a particular 
132. Id. at 515 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
133. Id. at 516. 
134. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the Constitution: An 
Economic Analysis of the Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 
123-29 (1993). 
135. Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Reassessing the Role of the 
Independent Judiciary in Enforcing Interest-Group Bargains, 5 CONST. POL. ECON. I 
(1994). 
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industry ordinarily does not run foul of takings law, 136 but civil 
forfeiture imposes costs on only a part of the industry. As a conse-
quence of drug criminalization, civil forfeiture singles out those 
individuals who have been caught drug trafficking, and those unlucky or 
foolish enough to permit dealers to use their property. The Takings 
Clause ordinarily would require compensation in such cases, because it 
"bar[s] Government from forcing some people alone to bear public 
burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public 
as a whole."137 The Court, however, has rejected takings challenges 
to forfeitures on the ground that forfeiture "further[s] the punitive and 
deterrent purposes that have been found sufficient to uphold, against 
constitutional challenge, the application of ... forfeiture statutes to the 
property of innocents."138 
This reasoning makes sense for criminal forfeiture, which explicitly 
punishes. The criminal law singles out individuals for punishment based 
on their behavior. Constitutional criminal procedure exists because 
legislatures are unlikely to supply optimal procedures for correctly 
singling out individuals who have committed crimes. Courts must step 
in to ensure adequate procedures. 139 The due process ideal that 
criminals should be precisely identified appeals to common notions of 
corrective justice, as well as efficiency concerns of optimal deterrence. 
Simply put, more precise criminal law enforcement yields greater 
deterrence of wrongdoers with fewer collateral costs imposed on 
innocents. 
Takings law provides a useful analogy to help explain why the 
Constitution mandates criminal procedures in certain contexts. Just as 
the requirement of just compensation forces government to internalize 
the costs of highways by imposing that cost on taxpayers as a whole, 
channeling crime fighting through the criminal process, and funding that 
136. See Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 VA. L. R.Ev. 
1333, 1347 (1991) ("regulatory plans that burden entire industries (such as legislation 
mandating automobile safety equipment or banning the sale of alcohol) are not 
compensable takings"). 
137. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
138. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 686 (1974) 
(emphasis added). The Court had earlier suggested that taking the property of "totally 
innocent people" would raise "serious constitutional questions" under the Takings 
Clause. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719-20 (1971). 
As this Article was going to print, however, the Court handed down its decision in 
Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (March 4, 1996), rejecting a challenge brought by 
an innocent owner. We discuss that decision and the historical treatment of innocent 
owners in a forthcoming article. See Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Innocence 
Lost: Bennis v. Michigan and the Forfeiture Tradition, Mo. L. REV. (forthcoming 
1996). 
139. See Pritchard, supra note 14, at 1069-74. 
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process through the general revenues, forces taxpayers to internalize the 
full social cost of criminalization and increases government accountabili-
ty. Criminal forfeiture, while not immune from rent-seeking abuses by 
government officials, reduces externality problems.14° Criminal 
forfeiture, like a criminal fine, is unambiguously subject to both the 
Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause, and the Sixth 
Amendment's right of trial by jury. 141 In addition, requiring govern-
ment to proceed criminally when it seeks forfeiture reduces prosecutors' 
bargaining power because they cannot trade criminal immunity for the 
turnover of assets. The revenue potential of forfeiture would be 
curtailed by the requirement of a criminal conviction, and politicians and 
law enforcement authorities would feel the full budgetary implications 
of a drug war. More importantly, criminal forfeiture affords defendants 
the accuracy-enhancing criminal process which protects against 
erroneous singling out of the innocent. 
Criminal forfeiture has other advantages. Civil forfeiture ties agency 
revenues to criminal behavior, presenting a unique opportunity for law 
enforcement abuse, which is absent when civil forfeiture is used in a 
legal industry. For example, when the Food and Drug Administration 
seizes misbranded or defective drugs from a pharmaceutical company, 
the company is part of a lobby that can push Congress for changes in 
forfeiture enforcement if the FDA abuses its authority. Under the Drug 
Act, however, Congress has criminalized the behavior giving rise to the 
forfeiture, leaving no lobby to campaign for reform. Because few bear 
the burden of forfeiture, and Congress has effectively disenfranchised 
those individuals from the interest group lobbying that produces 
legislation, the heightened protection of criminal procedures is needed. 
Abuses left unchecked by the courts will go unchecked altogether. 
Although the judiciary has an important role to play in cabining civil 
forfeiture, perceived abuse does not warrant judicial conjuring of novel 
constitutional doctrines. Justice Scalia noted such a trend in the Court's 
Austin decision. 
We have never held that the Constitution requires negligence, or any other 
degree of culpability, to support such forfeitures .... If the Court is correct that 
140. For a discussion of criminal forfeiture's revival, see Karla R. Spaulding, "Hit 
Them Where it Hurts": RICO Criminal Forfeitures and White Collar Crime, 80 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY I 97, I 98-211 (1989). 
141. See Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2769 (1993). 
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culpability of the owner is essential, then there is no difference ( except perhaps 
the burden of proof) between the traditional in rem forfeiture and the traditional 
in personam forfeiture. Well-established common-law distinctions should not 
be swept away by reliance on bits of dicta. 142 
We share Justice Scalia's desire to maintain "[w]ell-established common-
law distinctions." Indeed, given the rent-seeking abuses identified in 
Part I, we believe that the Court should restore the "common-law 
distinctions" that served to protect liberty. 
In this Part, we criticize the Court's approach to curbing civil 
forfeiture abuses. We then sketch an alternative constitutional frame-
work for answering civil forfeiture questions. Our framework restores 
"common-law distinctions" and finds support in both economics and 
history. In our view, the Court went astray when it discarded the 
common-law distinction between personal property, which was subject 
to in rem forfeiture, and real property forfeiture, which required an in 
personam criminal conviction. That distinction is crucial to any coherent 
civil forfeiture doctrine. Furthermore, our rule would permit the 
government to proceed in rem--unconstrained by the Bill of Rights 
provisions traditionally applied only in criminal proceedings--only 
against personal property. In order to obtain real property through 
forfeiture, the government would first have to criminally convict the 
property owner in personam. 
A. Defects of the Current Constitutional Regime 
The government's expansion of civil forfeiture has left the Court in a 
doctrinal quagmire. Beginning with Boyd, the Court has confronted civil 
forfeiture abuses using a "selective incorporation" approach, extending 
some, but not all, criminal constitutional protections to civil forfei-
ture. 143 The Court, however, has done so in a grudging and haphazard 
fashion, without explaining why certain protections have been extended 
while others have not. 144 Boyd invoked Fourth and Fifth Amendment 
protections ordinarily limited to criminal proceedings based on the 
142. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2814 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgment). 
143. Compare Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968) (Black, J., 
concurring) ( advocating total incorporation of the Bill of Rights through the Fourteenth 
Amendment) with id. at 176 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's ad hoc 
"selective incorporation"). 
144. See, e.g., Austin v. United States, I 13 S. Ct. 2801, 2804-05 n.4 (1993); United 
States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242,248 (1980); Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,400 n.3 
(I 937); see also Schecter, supra note 34, at 1157-78 (criticizing selective application of 
criminal constitutional provisions to forfeitures and advocating criminal procedures for 
all proceedings under the Drug Act). 
112 
[VOL. 33: 79, 1996] Civil Forfeiture 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
Court's conclusion that the forfeiture was "quasi-criminal." No guidance 
was offered, however, in determining what other constitutional provi-
sions would be required by "quasi-criminal" forfeiture. 145 Unable to 
formulate a limiting principle for the "quasi-criminal" category, the 
Court simply ignored it when confronted with other constitutional 
claims. 
Faced with the forfeiture abuses of the Drug Act, the contemporary 
Court has continued Boyd's tradition of checking abuse by invoking 
constitutional provisions on an ad hoc basis. In Austin, the Court used 
an amorphous remedial/punitive standard for determining when the 
protections of the Eighth Amendment, ordinarily limited to criminal 
cases, 146 should be brought to bear in a civil proceeding. 147 Tradi-
tional constitutional standards, however, allow the government to punish 
only after a criminal conviction. 148 If the forfeiture "punished" Austin 
in a constitutional sense, no forfeiture of any amount should have been 
permitted absent a criminal conviction. Austin, of course, had already 
faced prosecution criminally, so double jeopardy would have barred a 
criminal forfeiture prosecution. Austin not only departed from traditional 
notions of punishment, but it also requires a case-by-case analysis with 
an involved factual accounting of a forfeited property's value relative to 
the harm suffered by the government. Austin followed Halper, in which 
the Court offhandedly dismissed the traditional dividing line between 
civil and criminal protections: "The notion of punishment, as we 
commonly understand it, cuts across the division between the civil and 
I 45. Cf. J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A 
Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 414 (1976) ("[Boyd's] 
term 'quasi-criminal,' ... has muddied legal waters ever since."). 
146. Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 568, 573-74 (1833) ("The eighth 
amendment is addressed to courts ... exercising criminal jurisdiction .... "). 
Id. 
14 7. See supra notes I 02-14 and accompanying text. 
148. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671-72 n.40 (1977). The Court stated: 
Eighth Amendment scrutiny is appropriate only after the State has complied 
with the constitutional guarantees traditionally associated with criminal 
prosecutions .... [T]he State does not acquire the power to punish with which 
the Eight Amendment is concerned until after it has secured a formal 
adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of law. Where the State 
seeks to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the pertinent 
constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
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the criminal law."149 The Court's reliance on Halper in Austin sug-
gests that the Court will extend the remedial/punitive analysis when 
assessing double jeopardy challenges to civil forfeitures, further blurring 
the line between civil and criminal constitutional procedures. 
The Court's decisions in this area have led to confusion in the lower 
courts. The Ninth Circuit has recently held that forfeiture under the 
Drug Act always constitutes punishment, 150 reading the Court's 
decision in Austin: "[to] resolve[] the 'punishment' issue with respect to 
forfeiture cases for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause as well as 
the Excessive Fines Clause. In short, if a forfeiture constitutes 
punishment under the Halper criteria, it constitutes 'punishment' for the 
purposes of both clauses."151 Looking "to the requirements of the 
forfeiture statute as a whole," the Ninth Circuit concluded that Drug Act 
forfeitures operated "at least in part to punish and deter."152 Accord-
ingly, any civil forfeiture under the Drug Act subsequent to criminal 
conviction was barred by double jeopardy. 153 
We disagree with the courts that have read Austin to hold that double 
jeopardy should apply generally to civil forfeitures. To determine if the 
defendant is being punished twice, Halper requires ad hoc balancing of 
the government's damages relative to the forfeited property's value. 154 
Sanctioning conduct both criminally and civilly, however, has long been 
held constitutional. 155 Double jeopardy provides the wrong constitu-
tional framework for tackling the disproportionality problems raised by 
civil forfeiture. If a penalty genuinely punishes, its constitutionality 
should not tum on whether it is imposed before, after, or simultaneously 
149. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48 (1989). 
150. See United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1222 (9th Cir. 
1994), cert. granted, United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 762 (1996), argued April 17, 
1996. This decision has led to chaos in the district courts of the Ninth Circuit. See 
generally Joan L. Cobb, Forfeiture Decision Generates Veritable Explosion of Relief, 8 
BNA CRJM. PRAC. MAN. 590 (I 994). 
151. $405,089.23, 33 F.3d at 1219. 
152. Id. at 1220-2 I. 
153. Id. at 1222; accord United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568,573 (6th Cir. 1995), 
cert. granted, I 16 S. Ct. 762 (1996), argued April 17, 1996 ("any civil forfeiture under 
21 U.S.C. § 88I(a)(7) constitutes punishment for double jeopardy purposes"). 
154. United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295,298 (5th Cir. 1994) ("Halper . .. focuses 
on the relationship between the amount of the civil sanction and the amount required to 
serve the remedial purpose of reimbursing the costs incurred by the government and 
society as a result of the wrongful conduct."). 
155. United States v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 381, 385 (1954) ("Clearly Congress may 
impose both a criminal and a civil sanction in respect to the same act; this is neither 
unusual nor constitutionally objectionable."). 
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with criminal punishment. It should be unconstitutional unless imposed 
in a criminal proceeding. 156 Due process accuracy requires no less. 
In applying double jeopardy to civil forfeitures, the Court further 
confuses the question of when criminal constitutional procedures will 
apply in civil proceedings. 157 Prior criminal punishment should not 
bar the government from subsequently taking away the instrumentalities 
by which a criminal might commit future crimes. By the same token, 
when the government seizes instrumentalities used in the drug trade, a 
prior civil forfeiture should not bar subsequent prosecution if the 
government later uncovers evidence warranting such prosecution. To be 
sure, the government can avoid such complications by bringing its 
criminal case and civil forfeiture action simultaneously, 158 but it can 
do this only if it knows the scope of the defendant's wrongdoing (and 
the instrumentalities employed) at the time of the initial action. 
Not satisfied with invoking criminal protections on an ad hoc basis, 
the Court has also invented novel civil protections. Good invoked the 
civil ad hoc balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge159 to limit govern-
ment seizure of real property for forfeiture. This inquiry, however, 
requires the same case-by-case analysis that makes Austin so unwieldy. 
Further, Good provides no clues as to what further civil forfeiture 
procedures might spring from the Mathews balancing test. 160 Finally, 
it calls into question long available civil procedures, such as the 
156. See Lawrence A. Kasten, Note, Extending Constitutional Protection to Civil 
Forfeitures that Exceed Rough Remedial Compensation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 194, 
237 {I 99 I) ("On careful inspection, the distinction between double jeopardy and other 
safeguards, especially in the forfeiture context, becomes illusory."). 
157. See Peter J. Henning, Precedents in a Vacuum: The Supreme Court Continues 
to Tinker with Double Jeopardy, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. I, 67 (1993) ("The application 
of Halper to civil forfeiture actions could seriously impede the government's ability to 
pursue parallel civil and criminal proceedings."). But see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional 
Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding 
and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, I 369-
1404 (1991) (certain constitutional criminal procedures should be applied in civil cases). 
158. Compare United States v. Millan, 2 F.3d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993) (no Halper 
problem where civil forfeiture suit and criminal case brought in "a single prosecution") 
with United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 1994) 
("A forfeiture case and a criminal prosecution would constitute the same proceeding only 
if they were brought in the same indictment and tried at the same time."). 
159. 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 442-46 
{1992). 
160. See, e.g., United States v. Michelle's Lounge, 39 F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(applying Matthews to grant post-seizure hearing on probable cause to seize proceeds). 
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government's ability to collect taxes through summary procedures. In 
our view, such an unpredictable approach poorly checks civil forfeiture 
abuses. 
The Court's recent decisions have produced a mish-mash of criminal 
and civil procedures. In rem civil forfeiture now sits uneasily between 
the realms of criminal and civil law. A more determinate, predictable, 
and rule-based approach to forfeiture is available if the Court is willing 
to reconsider prior holdings and return civil forfeiture to its historical 
function---and boundaries---under the common law. The next sections 
outline that approach. 
B. Due Process: Civil or Criminal Procedures? 
This Section addresses the application of criminal constitutional 
procedures to forfeiture. Although the "Court has often stated that the 
question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or 
criminal is a matter of statutory construction,"161 we think, at bottom, 
that question necessarily implicates the accuracy concerns of due 
process. The seminal case on due process accuracy is Murray s Lessee 
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. 162 Murray s Lessee requires that 
judges: 
examine the constitution itself, to see whether this process be in conflict with 
any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we must look to those settled 
usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and statue [sic] law 
of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not 
to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted 
on by them after the settlement of this country. 163 
Under this standard, a remedy available in a civil proceeding at common 
law carries the strong presumption validating its current use as a civil 
remedy. But the contrary proposition does not follow; the Court has not 
frozen common law requirements into the Constitution. 
[A] process of law, which is not otherwise forbidden, must be taken to be due 
process of law, if it can show the sanction of settled usage both in England and 
in this country; but it by no means follows that nothing else can be due process 
of law. . . . [T]o hold that such a characteristic is essential to due process of 
law, would be to deny every quality of the law but its age, and ... render it 
incapable of progress or improvement. It would be to stamp upon our 
jurisprudence the unchangeableness attributed to the laws of the Medes and 
Persians. 164 
161. United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980) (citations omitted). 
162. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
I 63. Id. at 277. 
164. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 528-29 (1884). 
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This is no license for legislative procedural innovation: "no change in 
ancient procedure can be made which disregards those fundamental 
principles, to be ascertained from time to time by judicial action, which 
have relation to process of law and protect the citizen in his private 
right, and guard him against the arbitrary action of government."165 
Thus, the choice between civil and criminal procedures cannot be 
resolved solely by reference to common law practice. 166 
To carry the analysis further, we must distinguish among the three 
strands of due process. Due process has both civil and criminal 
procedural elements, as well as a substantive element. The Court 
balances three factors in civil due process cases: 
[l J the private interest that will be affected by the official action; [2) the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
[3) the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail. 167 
In Medina v. California, the Court held this balancing test inapplicable 
to criminal proceedings; instead, the Court examined historical practice 
to determine whether a challenged procedure "offends some principle of 
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental." 168 In the criminal context, due process has 
narrow application beyond the specific guarantees of the Bill of 
Rights. 169 The most conspicuous example of an independent procedure 
required by due process is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 170 That 
165. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, IOI (1908). But see In re Winship, 397 
U.S. 358, 382 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) ("For me the only correct meaning of [due 
process) is that our Government must proceed according to the 'law of the land'--that 
is, according to written constitutional and statutory provisions as interpreted by court 
decisions.") 
166. Cf Clark, supra note 145, at 409 ("[T]he Court might find it very difficult to 
determine which offenses are so serious that any punishment based on their intentional 
commission, even if labeled 'civil,' should trigger constitutional safeguards. The 
proliferation of statutory offenses would render any historical reference to common law 
impossible in many cases." (footnotes omitted)). 
167. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976). 
168. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445 (1992) (internal quotations omitted). 
169. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (I 990). 
170. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). 
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rule, however, is no ad hoc judicial innovation; it is well founded in 
historical practice. 171 
The Court's application of different tests in civil and criminal contexts 
does not necessarily reflect a different standard; each inquiry balances 
the costs and benefits of procedural schemes. 172 Each test has the 
same goal: Reasonable accuracy given the severity of the threatened 
sanction. 173 In the criminal context, that standard has been crystallized 
in historical tradition and the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. 
Case-by-case judicial balancing is unlikely to improve upon that 
historical balance, proved valid by experience. In the civil context, by 
contrast, Congress has demonstrated an inventiveness in creating new 
offenses and procedures that has left common-law procedures far 
behind. 174 The judiciary has confronted that legislative innovation with 
flexibility of its own in construing the requirements of due process. 
The question whether a given penalty must be enforced through civil 
or criminal proceedings raises similar accuracy concerns. Unless the 
judiciary grants Congress carte blanche to punish through civil proce-
dures, courts must look beyond the label affixed by the legislature. The 
doctrinal hook is supplied by the third due process strand: substantive 
due process. Under substantive due process standards, the government 
cannot punish an individual without first establishing his guilt in a 
criminal trial. 175 However, "[n]ot every disability ... amounts to 
punishment."176 In determining whether a given sanction "punishes," 
thus requiring criminal procedures, the Court applies seven factors: 
171. "Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt standard in 
common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a requirement of due 
process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law 
should be enforced and justice administered."' Id. at 361-62 ( quoting Duncan v. 
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968)). 
172. See Cheh, supra note 157, at 135 l ("One can view the Bill of Rights itself as 
a balancing of interests between the costs of procedures and the benefits they confer. 
Any decision to extend procedural protections beyond tbose instances where they clearly 
apply requires a similar calculation."). 
173. See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 363 ("The reasonable-doubt standard ... is a 
prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error. ... The 
accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance."). 
l 74. See Cheh, supra note 157, at 1337 ("There is almost no limit to the creativity 
of Congress in thinking of ways to sanction participants in government regulated 
activities."). 
175. United States v. Salemo, 481 U.S. 739, 748-49 (1987) ("general rule of 
substantive due process" precludes government from inflicting punishment prior to a 
criminal trial); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 536 n.17 (1979) (noting "general 
principle that punishment can only follow a determination of guilt after trial or plea"); 
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,237 (1896) (due process requires a "judicial 
trial to establish the guilt of the accused" before confiscating his or her property). 
176. Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. 
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[I] whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, [2] 
whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment, [3] whether it comes 
into play only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether its operation will promote 
the traditional aims of punishment--,etribution and deterrence, [5] whether the 
behavior to which it applies is already a crime, [6] whether an alternative 
purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and [7] 
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned . 
177 
Given the number of factors, it is no surprise that the Court's decisions 
applying them are unclear. 178 The application of these factors to 
forfeiture, however, is tolerably clear. In the next sections we apply 
these due process standards to personal and real property. 
C. Due Process: Personal Property 
Historically, in rem forfeiture allowed courts to hear actions against 
property owned by individuals who were beyond the courts' in personam 
jurisdiction.179 Forfeiture of vessels employed in wrong-doing carries 
a sound functional justification with its long historical pedigree. In rem 
procedures were essential to enforce revenue and piracy laws, given that 
the vessels' owners were usually beyond the court's jurisdiction. The 
government often would be left remediless if required to obtain personal 
jurisdiction over the owner. The personification fiction solves this 
jurisdictional dilemma: "The vessel which commits the aggression is 
treated as the offender, as the guilty instrument or thing to which the 
forfeiture attaches, without any reference whatsoever to the character or 
conduct of the owner."180 Justice Story justified the fiction as arising 
"from the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of suppress-
ing the offence or wrong, or insuring an indemnity to the injured 
party."1s1 
177. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963). 
178. Clark, supra note 145, at 384 ("Notwithstanding general agreement about this 
core concept [ of punishment], the Court's application of it to particular cases has proved 
to be highly unpredictable and confusing."). 
179. See supra text accompanying note 62. 
180. United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1844). 
181. Id. Cf. 0.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 28 (Little, Brown, and 
Company 1881) ('The ship is the only security available in dealing with foreigners, and 
rather than send one's own citizens to search for a remedy abroad in strange courts, it 
is easy to seize the vessel and satisfy the claim at home, leaving the foreign owners to 
get their indemnity as they may be able."). 
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In rem procedures were not limited to admiralty; the customs laws 
also authorized the seizure on land of goods that had been illegally 
imported. 182 The admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to such sei-
zures,183 but permitting in rem procedures on land for customs 
violations comports with the logic of their use in admiralty for seizing 
vessels. The owner of the goods may well have been beyond the court's 
in personam jurisdiction, and forfeiture was the government's only 
means for collecting the tax. Moreover, the sanction imposed usually 
fell within the broad range of the government's expenses resulting from 
the smuggling. 184 Requiring a criminal conviction before forfeiting 
smuggled goods might leave the government without any sanction 
against the owner. 185 Finally, the government's entitlement to collect 
taxes by seizing the property could be defeated if the goods were 
removed from the jurisdiction before judgment: "revenue seizures ... 
are always of personal and movable property."186 Thus, summary 
182. See, e.g., Clifton v. United States, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 242, 243 (1846). 
183. United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 72, 76 (1838) ("[I]n cases purely 
dependent upon the locality of the act done, it is limited to the sea, and to tide waters, 
as far as the tide flows; and that it does not reach beyond high water mark."). Forfeiture 
proceedings for goods seized on land were authorized by Congress's "power to regulate 
commerce and navigation, and to levy and collect duties." Id. at 78. 
184. See One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232,237 (1972). 
The Court stated: 
Id. 
[The] forfeiture is intended to aid in the enforcement of tariff regulations. It 
prevents forbidden merchandise from circulating in the United States, and, by 
its monetary penalty, it provides a reasonable form of liquidated damages for 
violation of the inspection provisions and serves to reimburse the Government 
for investigation and enforcement expenses. 
185. See Origet v. United States, 125 U.S. 240,246 (1888) ("The person punished 
for the offence may be an entirely different person from the owner of the merchandise, 
or any person interested in it. The forfeiture of the goods of the principal can form no 
part of the personal punishment of his agent."). This rule still provides the government 
with greater rights against the ship and its cargo than a private party would have. See 
United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 235 (1844) ("So far as 
the general maritime law applies to torts or injuries committed on the high seas and 
within the admiralty jurisdiction, the general rule is, not forfeiture of the offending 
property; but compensation to the full extent of all damages sustained or reasom,bly 
allowable, to be enforced by a proceeding therefor in rem or in personam."). 
186. Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 331,348 (1870). In rem proceedings 
also prevented jurisdictional conflicts. See Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 
268, 294 (1870). The Miller Court stated: 
Id. 
120 
In revenue and admiralty cases a seizure is undoubtedly necessary to confer 
upon the court jurisdiction over the thing when the proceeding is in rem. In 
most such cases the res is movable personal property, capable of actual 
manucaption. Unless taken into actual possession by an officer of the court, 
it might be eloigned before a decree of condemnation could be made, and thus 
the decree would be ineffectual. 
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search and seizure of goods imported without payment of duties, 
accompanied by streamlined forfeiture procedures, protected the public 
revenues from massive fraud. 187 
The historical justification for in rem civil forfeiture supports the 
constitutionality of at least some personal property forfeitures under the 
Drug Act. 188 For example, the long tradition of civil forfeiture of 
contraband189 affirms the constitutionality of forfeiting illegal 
drugs. 190 Accuracy concerns are minimal because adjudication 
addresses only the good's identity.191 The government's power to 
proscribe possession of certain goods encompasses the power to destroy 
the offending object. 192 The owner has not been singled out as a 
lawbreaker, because his culpability is irrelevant.193 The government 
can eliminate property rights in such goods. This rationale has its limits; 
the label "contraband" does not define a fixed set. Notwithstanding 
these limits, proceedings for the forfeiture of contraband may be more 
attenuated than those normally afforded in cases involving personal 
property; the Court has properly recognized that elaborate procedures are 
187. See generally In re Platt, 19 F. Cas. 815, 816-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 
11,212) (Blatchford, J.) (discussing history and policy of customs searches). 
188. Not all assertions of in rem jurisdiction over personal property satisfy due 
process. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (striking down Delaware's "quasi 
in rem" jurisdiction over stock of Delaware corporations). 
189. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599-600 (1950) 
("One of the oldest examples is the summary destruction of property without prior notice 
or hearing for the protection of public health. There is no constitutional reason why 
Congress in the interests of consumer protection may not extend that area of control.") 
190. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(f) (1995) (authorizing forfeiture and destruction of 
controlled substances). 
191. Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 322 (1870) (Field, J., 
dissenting) ("the thing, thus subject to seizure, itself furnishes the evidence for its own 
condemnation"). 
192. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58-59 (1924) (no property rights in 
liquor). 
Id. 
193. See Clark, supra note 145, at 479. Clark notes: 
It seems clear that forfeiture of contraband items can be justified as regulatory 
rather than punitive even apart from the formal 'property interest' idea. 
Forfeiture of such items does not depend on their use to commit an illegal act, 
so that the sanction of forfeiture does not apply uniquely to lawbreakers. 
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unnecessary. 194 A similar rule applies to stolen and smuggled 
goods. 195 
The government, through civil forfeiture, can also obtain conveyances 
used to transport drugs. Ships used in smuggling are within civil 
forfeiture's domain. Although a closer question, automobiles and 
airplanes are arguably analogous instrumentalities within that traditional 
domain. 196 The risk of disproportionality usually will be small because 
the value of the conveyance will not be great. Moreover, the contraband 
ordinarily will be found within the conveyance, making the forfeiture 
determination straightforward and minimizing accuracy concerns. The 
full panoply of criminal procedures should not come into play simply 
because forfeiture sanctions the possession of a criminalized good, rather 
than aiding revenue collection. 197 The owners of the automobiles, 
however, are likely to be within the court's in personam jurisdiction. In 
light of the historical justification for civil forfeiture, the Supreme Court 
194. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594,599 (1950) (Upholding 
the forfeiture of mislabeled goods: "It is sufficient, where only property rights are 
concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial 
determination."). See also Marc B. Stahl, Asset Forfeiture, Burdens of Proof and the 
War on Drugs, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 274, 306 (1992) ("forfeiture statutes 
aimed at per se contraband should be subjected to limited scrutiny"). The Seventh 
Amendment, however, may require a jury for forfeiture of goods seized on land. 
Compare Four Hundred and Forty-Three Cans of Frozen Egg Product v. United States, 
226 U.S. 172 (1912) (jury trial required to forfeit impure food) with Van Oster v. 
Kansas, 272 U.S. 465,469 (1926) (no jury required in state forfeiture proceeding). 
I 95. The Boyd Court stated: 
The seizure of stolen goods is authorized by the common law; and the seizure 
of goods forfeited for a breach of the revenue laws, or concealed to avoid the 
duties payable on them, has been authorized by English statutes for at least 
two centuries past; and the like seizures have been authorized by our own 
revenue acts from the commencement of the government. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 623 (1886). See also North American Cold 
Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (I 908) (no prior hearing required to seize 
and destroy unwholesome food). 
196. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. United States, 286 U.S. 49, 56 (1932) 
("Forfeiture of vehicles bearing smuggled goods is one of the time-honored methods 
adopted by the Government for the repression of the crime of smuggling." ). 
l 97. See id. at 62 ("Courts accepting the conclusion that the customs forfeitures are 
ended in respect of intoxicating liquors have been unable to extricate themselves from 
the conclusion that forfeitures under the navigation acts have fallen at the same time."). 
Some constitutional protections commonly applied in criminal contexts would apply to 
automobiles as well, even if not applied to seizures of contraband. See, e.g., One 1958 
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 699 (1965) (applying Fourth 
Amendment to forfeiture of car, distinguishing contraband exception: "There is nothing 
even remotely criminal in possessing an automobile."). On some matters, the 
requirements of due process and a criminal constitutional provision may be the same. 
See, e.g., United States v. Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Fifty Dollars ($8,850) in 
United States Currency, 461 U.S. 555, 564 (1983) (due process employs balancing test 
used under the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial). 
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could properly adopt a rule requiring the government to show that the 
conveyance had crossed a jurisdictional boundary or that the owner was 
beyond the court's in personamjurisdiction before the conveyance could 
be forfeited civilly; otherwise, a criminal proceeding would be re-
quired.198 
The forfeiture of drug trafficking proceeds199 poses a more compli-
cated question. Congress plainly adopted the provision to deter drug 
trafficking.20° Forfeiture statutes have traditionally "applied to stolen 
goods, but they did not apply to proceeds from the sale of stolen 
goods."201 The forfeiture of proceeds cannot be considered a form of 
restitution because consensual transactions do not create "victims." The 
forfeiture of profits from illegal drug trafficking seems nonproblematic, 
given the use of disgorgement for illegal profits in the antitrust and 
securities areas. The disgorgement of £rofits is nonpunitive because it 
simply restores the status quo ante. 02 Profiting from an illegal 
transaction falls squarely within the common-law understanding of unjust 
enrichment; forfeiture of profits simply imposes a constructive trust on 
that unjust enrichment.203 The civil remedy of the constructive trust 
is well known to the common law.204 Civil forfeiture of profits merely 
affords the government a civil alternative for securing its entitlement to 
these monies. 
The forfeiture of all proceeds raises greater concerns. It is difficult to 
distinguish a forfeiture of proceeds from a 100% tax, which is arguably 
l 98. But see Bennis v. Michigan, l l 6 S. Ct. 994 (l 996) (forfeiture of innocent 
owner's interest in car is neither a taking nor a due process violation). 
199. 21 U.S.C. § 88l(a)(6) (1995). 
200. Senator Sam Nunn, § 88 l(a)(6)'s sponsor, sought "a meaningful deterrent. .. . 
[A]stronomical profit, is the base motivation of drug traffickers. The amendment .. . 
is intended to enhance the efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs in the United States 
by striking out against the profits from illicit drug trafficking." 124 CONG. REc. 23,055 
(l 978). 
201. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126, l 134 (1993); id. at 
l l 35 ("[W]e are not aware of any common-law precedent for treating proceeds traceable 
to an unlawful exchange as a fictional wrongdoer .... "). 
202. See S.E.C. v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 696 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (disgorgement of 
"ill-gotten gains" does not constitute punishment for double jeopardy purposes). 
203. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (per curiam) (imposing 
constructive trust on profits from book published by ex-CIA agent in violation of 
contractual commitment). 
204. E. Allan Farnsworth, Your Loss or My Gain? The Dilemma of the 
Disgorgement Principle in Breach of Contract, 94 YALE L.J. 1339, 1351-69 (1985) 
(discussing historical development of disgorgement principle). 
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punitive.205 Although in rem forfeiture of proceeds was unknown at 
common law, we believe there are common-law analogues. The 
government is arguably entitled to drug proceeds because of its superior 
property right in the drugs themselves prior to the defendant's conver-
sion of the drugs into cash. 206 On this view, proceeds forfeiture is 
simply a form of tracing. In some cases, the government has seized 
proceeds or frozen accounts. When the claimant to those funds then 
comes into court seeking equity, a court can properly deny relief based 
on the claimant's "unclean hands." Civil forfeiture of proceeds simply 
reduces this venerable equitable doctrine to a rule of law, but the 
question is a close one. 207 The labelling of drugs as "contraband" is 
simply a device by which the government seeks to control crime;208 
the validity of the tracing rationale is dependent on the strength of the 
government's property right in the drugs.209 
A less formalistic rationale for the forfeiture of drug proceeds can be 
found in civil forfeiture's historic function. Money today, like ships 
historically, can move easily across jurisdictional boundaries, via check, 
wire transfer, or suitcase. Consequently, the money's owner may be 
beyond the personal jurisdiction of United States courts. As with ships, 
therefore, imposing stringent monitoring duties on owners of currency 
may be "the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of 
suppressing the offence or wrong."210 The civil forfeiture of proceeds 
from drug trafficking fits within the historical justification for in rem 
forfeiture. 
205. See Department of Revenue ofMont. v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994); 
United States v. Lafranca, 282 U.S. 568 (1931). 
206. See Henning, supra note 157, at 65-66 ("It is unlikely that a forfeiture action 
to reach the proceeds of drug transactions, as permitted under § 88l(a)(6), would be 
found to be punitive because the money is a substitute for the narcotics, a byproduct of 
the violation."). 
207. Compare United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 33 F.3d 1210, 1221 
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. granted, United States v. Ursery 116 S. Ct. 762 (1995) (distinguish-
ing proceeds from profits) with United States v. Tilley, 18 F.3d 295,300 (5th Cir. 1994) 
(forfeiture of proceeds not punishment, because "the forfeiture of drug proceeds will 
always be directly proportional to the amount of drugs sold"). 
Id. 
208. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306 n.l l (1967). The Court stated: 
[C]ontraband is indeed property in which the Government holds a superior 
interest, but only because the Government decides to vest such an interest in 
itself. And while there may be limits to what may be declared contraband, the 
concept is hardly more than a form through which the Government seeks to 
prevent and deter crime. 
209. See United States v. Private Sanitation Indus. Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., 
44 F.3d 1082, 1085-90 (2d Cir. 1995) (Heaney, J., dissenting) (discussing RICO 
disgorgement as a "quasi-criminal" sanction). 
210. United States v. The Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 233 (1894). 
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D. Due Process: Real Property 
The forfeiture of real property poses an even tougher constitutional 
question. In Austin, the Court avoided the question of whether real 
property forfeiture was a criminal punishment by extending the Eighth 
Amendment to noncriminal proceedings.211 In our view, the Court 
took a wrong tum in Austin. The Court has failed, until recently, to 
recognize the distinction between the forfeiture of personal property and 
the forfeiture of real property. Good212 recognizes the distinction, but 
fails to acknowledge the Court's previous errors that arose from having 
ignored the distinction. 
In our view, the incoherence of the Court's forfeiture doctrine stems 
from Dobbins s Distillery s abandonment of the common law require-
ment that the government criminally convict the owner to forfeit real 
property. Given the rather sparse use of real property forfeiture 
subsequent to Dobbins s Distillery, the Court's abandonment of that 
requirement originally did not pose great difficulties.213 The Drug Act, 
however, has greatly altered the stakes for the government, encouraging 
real property forfeiture and enhancing opportunities for abuse.214 
The Court approved Congress's extension of in rem forfeiture to real 
property under the Confiscation Acts without considering whether the in 
rem rationale extended to real property.215 The Court held that 
211. Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2806 n.6. (1993). 
212. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (1993). 
213. Real property forfeiture was rare before the Drug Act. David J. Fried, 
Rationalizing Criminal Forfeiture, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 328, 384 n.257 
(1988). Fried states: 
Id. 
[T]wo statutes ... provide for the civil forfeiture of land: land upon which 
an illegal still is found, 26 U.S.C. § 5615(3) (1982); and land of a brewery 
from which taxable beer has been removed for consumption or sale "with 
intent to defraud the United States of the tax thereon." 26 U.S.C. § 5673 
( 1982). There is no reported case of in rem forfeiture of real property under 
either of these statutes more recent than United States v. About 151.682 Acres 
of Land, 99 F.2d 716 (7th Cir. 1938). 
214. Cf id. at 331 ("Civil forfeiture is a farrago of injustices sanctified by tradition. 
Its historical justifications, such as they are, have been left behind by its alarming 
extension in recent years, and its adoption as a criminal punishment, when its validity 
has always depended on its status as a civil penalty, is unprincipled."). 
215. Union Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 759, 764 (1867). This 
holding contradicted the Court's rejection the previous term of the argument that in rem 
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Congress's war power permitted this abrogation of common-law 
procedures, but the seizure could have been upheld on a basis more 
consistent with the historic function of in rem jurisdiction. The 
Confiscation Acts fit neatly within the traditional jurisdictional rationale 
for in rem forfeiture. The owners of the property seized were ordinarily 
behind Confederate Jines. To require criminal conviction before 
forfeiting their real property effectively would have eliminated the 
government's right to the property of culpable individuals beyond the 
courts' in personam jurisdiction. The Court's rejection of such a 
requirement thus squared with in rem jurisdiction's historic function. 
Unfortunately, the Court extended in rem doctrine beyond its historical 
function in Dobbins 's Distillery.216 In Dobbins 's Distillery, the 
jurisdictional rationale that forfeiture was necessary to collect taxes was 
unavailable because the taxpayer was subject to the court's in personam 
jurisdiction.217 Moreover, the owner was also subject to in personam 
procedures were available at common law. The Court overturned a state court's 
assertion of in rem jurisdiction: 
The action against the steamer by name, authorized by the statute of 
California, is a proceeding in the nature and with the incidents of a suit in 
admiralty. The distinguishing and characteristic feature of such suit is that the 
vessel or thing proceeded against is itself seized and impleaded as the 
defendant, and is judged and sentenced accordingly. It is this dominion of the 
suit in admiralty over the vessel or thing itself which gives to the title made 
under its decrees validity against all the world. 
The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411,427 (1866). Moreover, the Court confirmed 
the unavailability of in rem proceedings in a common law proceeding the following term. 
See The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624, 644 (1868) ("[T]here is no form of action at 
common law which, when compared with the proceeding in rem in the admiralty, can 
be regarded as a concurrent remedy."). But see C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 
133, 143 (1943) ("[T]here is ample support for the conclusion that in the seaboard states 
forfeiture proceedings in rem, extending to seizures on navigable waters of the state, 
were an established procedure of the common law courts before the Revolution."). 
216. 96 U.S. 395 (1877). 
217. Moreover, the government could levy, by summary procedure, on any property 
owned by the taxpayer to the extent of the tax. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land 
& Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 273, 276-80 (1855) (holding that summary 
seizure ofreal property for payment of taxes owing did not violate due process, because 
such procedures were followed in both England and the colonies before the Revolution); 
see also G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977) (no Fourth 
Amendment violation in summary seizure of automobiles to satisfy tax claims); Phillips 
v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931) ("The right of the United States to collect 
its internal revenue by summary administrative proceedings has long been settled."); 
Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1880) (no due process violation in distraint and 
sale of real and personal property for satisfaction of unpaid taxes). This rather draconian 
levy power is justified by the need to ensure "voluntary compliance" with the tax 
system. G.M. Leasing Corp., 429 U.S. at 350. Private parties, by contrast, are not 
permitted such effective remedies. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (due 
process violated by creditor's ex parte replevin of goods). Good calls into question the 
government's power to summarily collect taxes. See United States v. James Daniel 
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jurisdiction, and therefore would have been subject to injunctive relief 
to assure compliance with the law. Nonetheless, the Court discarded the 
common law requirement of criminal conviction before real property 
forfeiture. The Court did not acknowledge the novelty of the proceed-
ing, nor did it consider whether the functional justifications for in rem 
procedures extended to real property. 
Notwithstanding Dobbins :S Distillery's novelty, the government has 
attempted to establish the constitutionality of in rem forfeiture of real 
property by sweeping it within the "guilty property" fiction. 218 The 
"guilty property" fiction, however, cannot be sustained beyond its 
original boundaries. The fiction can be traced to the ancient practice of 
deodand, but that practice was questioned early: "Even Blackstone, who 
is not known as a biting critic of the English legal tradition, condemned 
the seizure of the property of the innocent as based upon a 'superstition' 
inherited from the 'blind days' of feudalism."219 Justice Story similar-
ly condemned it: "deodand ... seems a peculiar case growing out of 
the avarice of the church and the superstition of the layity in ancient 
times."220 Whatever its status in England, "[d]eodands did not become 
part of the common-law tradition of this country."221 
Quite apart from deodand's rejection in America, the "guilty property" 
fiction never extended to real property at English common law. The 
fiction reached only personal property, which is inherently mobile; 
deodand, like revenue forfeiture, never extended to real property.222 
Justice Harlan's view that "centuries ofhistory support the Government's 
claim that forfeiture statutes . . . have an extraordinarily broad 
scope,"223 must be limited to personal property. History does not 
support the real property forfeiture upheld in Dobbins:S Distillery. 
Good Real Property, 114 S. Ct. 492, 509 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
218. See, e.g., Brief for the United States, United States v. James Daniel Good Real 
Property, 114 S. Ct. 492 (!993) (No. 92-1180). 
219. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1971) 
(Harlan, J.) (quoting I w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, ch. 8, *300). 
220. United States v. 1960 Bags of Coffee, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.) 398,413 (1814) 
(dissenting opinion). 
221. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing, 416 U.S. 663,682 (1973). Despite 
its archaic nature, deodand survived in England until 1846. Jacob J. Finkelstein, The 
Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death 
and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 169, 170-71 (1973). 
222. See supra notes 105-108 and accompanying text. 
223. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. at 719. 
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Although history does not support the constitutionality of in rem 
forfeiture, the government has other arguments. Due process does not 
limit the government to common-law procedures. The government can 
devise new civil procedures, as long those procedures do not "punish" 
in the constitutional sense. 224 But in our view, the forfeiture of real 
property "punishes" in the constitutional sense. 
Applying the Mendoza-Martinez factors,225 we conclude that civil 
forfeiture: (1) permanently restrains an owner's property interest; (2) 
historically has been seen as punishment; (3) requires scienter, both 
because the owner's innocence is a defense, and also in the commission 
of the underlying drug offense; (4) deters persons from drug trafficking; 
and (5) only applies to previously criminalized behavior. Factors (6) and 
(7) are more difficult to apply. The government can easily postulate "an 
alternative purpose" for civil forfeiture. The government has urged that 
civil forfeiture alleviates "[t]he drain on the public fisc attributable to the 
vastly increased law enforcement expenses that have accompanied the 
drug epidemic, and [funds] the care, treatment, and rehabilitation of drug 
addiction and related problems."226 However, by criminalizing narcot-
ics, the government has brought the law enforcement expenses on itself. 
A small percentage of forfeiture proceeds goes to treat addicts; the lion's 
share goes to enforcement.227 As to the seventh Mendoza-Martinez 
factor, real property forfeiture is also frequently "excessive in relation to 
the alternative purpose assigned," creating disproportionality problems 
of a magnitude rarely seen in personal property cases.228 Real property 
forfeiture was an exclusively criminal remedy at common law; this civil 
use of a traditionally criminal sanction places a much heavier burden on 
the government to show that it does not intend to punish. Where 
224. Cf Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 402 n.6 (1938) (Congress may not 
provide for enforcement of punitive sanctions in civil proceedings). 
225. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
226. Brief for the United States at 30-31, Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 492 
(1993) (No. 92-6073). 
227. In 1994, approximately one dollar in six of total federal expenditures in this 
area went for treatment. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1994, BUREAU 
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS tbl. 1.15 (1995). Forfeiture proceeds are likely to be more 
heavily biased toward enforcement given typical sharing arrangements. 
228. See United States v. Sixty Acres in Etowah County, 727 F. Supp. 1414, 1422 
(N.D. Ala. 1990), aff'd, 930 F.2d 857 (11th Cir. 1991). The court stated: 
Id. 
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The United States argues that all of Texas would be forfeited under a literal 
reading of§ 881 (a)(7) if Texas were owned by one person, and if one acre of 
it was used in a drug deal with the owner's knowledge or consent. The larger 
the tract and the smaller the portions misused, the more questionable may 
become the constitutionality of a literal application of the § 881 (a)(7) 
language. This court is happy not to have had to deal with this question. 
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government has abandoned the common law requirement of a criminal 
conviction, a presumption should arise that the government is punishing 
civilly.229 
The government cannot overcome that presumption in the context of 
real property forfeiture. Law enforcement is hardly a novel task for 
government, and it has not shown a need for novel procedures. Even 
without the civil forfeiture of real property, the government can still 
criminally prosecute offenders, and enforce criminal forfeiture where the 
offenders are also owners. Requiring a criminal conviction to forfeit real 
property would not substantially impair the government's ability to 
proscribe the property's illegal use.230 In personam criminal forfeiture 
would still permit the government to attach property subject to forfeiture 
pending the outcome of the criminal proceeding.231 The government 
can also substitute property of the defendant if the defendant has hidden 
property,232 and can set aside fraudulent transfers.233 To be sure, 
criminal forfeiture would bind only the defendant, not others holding a 
property interest,234 but this result would eliminate a substantial 
Id. 
229. See Clark, supra note 145, at 385. Clark notes: 
[I]f the law places special burdens specifically on a group of persons who have 
violated some legal prohibition, then there should exist a presumption that the 
law is punitive, absent convincing evidence of some other purpose. The 
analysis of alternative purpose should focus on the overbreadth or underbreadth 
of the legislation and on the presence or absence of a less burdensome 
alternative. 
230. See Gary M. Maveal, The Unemployed Criminal Alternative in the Civil War 
of Drug Forfeitures, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 35, 45-46 (1992) (advocating advantages of 
criminal forfeiture). 
231. See Rounds v. Cloverport Foundry & Mach. Co., 237 U.S. 303,306 (1915) 
(in personam jurisdiction authorizes auxiliary attachment). 
232. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(p) (1994). 
233. "The government has always possessed the implicit authority to set aside sham 
or fraudulent transfers intended to avoid in rem forfeitures and enjoyed the same 
authority as to inpersonam forfeitures under 1970 RICO." Fried, supra note 213, at 354 
n.120 (footnotes omitted). 
234. See Rounds, 237 U.S. at 306 (in rem "decree binds all the world"; in 
personam jurisdiction merely severs the personal interest of the defendant); see also The 
Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866), where the Court stated: 
By the common law process, whether of mesne attachment or execution, 
property is reached only through a personal defendant, and then only to the 
extent of his title. Under a sale, therefore, upon a judgment in a common law 
proceeding the title acquired can never be better than that possessed by the 
personal defendant. It is his title, and not the property itself, which is sold. 
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number of "innocent owner" questions.235 Under an in personam 
criminal regime, the government could forfeit only the defendant's 
interest. 236 
Even where the offender is not the owner, the government has not 
shown that common law remedies are insufficient to counter the social 
ill. If the government actually wishes to control an instrumentality of 
crime, it can proceed civilly against the owner in a nuisance action.237 
In a nuisance action, the government could seek an injunction against 
further illegal use, regardless of the owner's knowledge of prior illegal 
use. The injunctive relief could be enforced through the court's 
contempt power. If injunction and contempt proved ineffective, the 
government could force the owner to sell the property to a party who 
would ensure its lawful use.238 It will be the rare case where the 
government cannot assert in personam jurisdiction over the real 
property's owner. In such a case, resort to civil forfeiture would then 
be appropriate because it would be within civil forfeiture's traditional 
domain. 
Real property is not dangerous in and of itself; it becomes an 
instrumentality of the drug trade only in the hands of a criminal 
offender.239 The government's neglect of these options suggests that 
Id. at 427. See also Maxeiner, supra note 37, at 773 ("common-law forfeiture normally 
took only the interest the attainted traitor or felon had in the property"). 
235. Leslie C. Smith, Modem Forfeiture Law and Policy: A Proposal for Reform, 
19 WM. & MARYL. REV. 661, 711 (1978) ("A forfeiture law which requires a finding 
of guilty in the related criminal proceedings . . . appears desirable. The primary 
constitutional objection, the forfeiture of property without due process when innocent 
persons are involved, would thereby be removed, and only the offender's interest in the 
property would be subject to forfeiture."). 
Commentators often fret about the forfeiture of innocent owners' property. See, e.g., 
Steven L. Schwarcz & Alan E. Rothman, Civil Forfeiture: A Higher Form of 
Commercial Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 287, 288 (1993); Damon G. Saltzburg, Note, 
Real Property Forfeitures as a Weapon in the Government's War on Drugs: A Failure 
to Protect Innocent Ownership Rights, 72 B.U. L. REV. 217, 218-19 (1992); Patricia M. 
Canavan, Note, Civil Forfeiture of Real Property: The Government's Weapon Against 
Drug Traffickers Injures Innocent Owners, 10 PACE L. REV. 485,486 (1990); Michael 
Goldsmith & Mark J. Linderman, Asset Forfeiture and Third Party Rights: The Need 
for Further Law Reform, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1254, 1256-59. We address this topic from 
an historical perspective in a forthcoming article. Boudreaux & Pritchard, supra note 
138. 
236. Criminal forfeiture provides for notice and hearing to third party claimants. 
Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277-78 (1876). The claimant, however, must 
establish his interest. 21 U.S.C. § 853(n) (1994). 
237. 21 U.S.C. § 882 (1982). 
238. See United States v. du Pont & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 333-35 (1961) (enforcing 
divestiture of stock holdings that violated Clayton Act). 
239. Stahl, supra note I 94, at 3 I 8 ("a particular building does not make it easier 
to sell or store drugs and a particular piece of land does not make it easier to grow or 
manufacture drugs"). 
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it primarily intends to punish wrongdoers and collect revenues while 
evading the criminal process. Given that less restrictive and equally 
efficacious alternatives are available-in addition to the practice's lack 
of historical sanctioilc-------Civil forfeiture of real property violates due 
process. The Court should overrule Dobbins s Distillery and require that 
the government proceed criminally when seeking to forfeit real 
property. 240 
Due process accuracy concerns counsel a return to the common law 
requirement that the government obtain a criminal conviction before 
forfeiting real property. Having freed the government from common law 
requirements, the Court has been unable to rely on that common law 
baseline in confronting the subsequent abuses that followed as the 
government expanded civil forfeiture. Absent a showing by the 
government that the common law framework cannot handle modem 
conditions, the Court should return to that framework. Requiring a 
criminal conviction would go far toward ensuring that the real property 
owner has been properly singled out for violating the drug laws because 
it would necessarily invoke the procedural protections that ordinarily 
accompany criminal prosecutions. The abuses engendered by the 
government's use of in rem forfeiture-like those seen in Austin and 
Good-would be minimized. In Austin, if forfeiture had been done 
criminally, the Excessive Fines Clause would plainly have limited the 
punishment imposed on Austin.241 Given that criminal sanctions must 
be a multiple of the harm done to adequately deter, the forfeiture would 
240. Public choice theory provides another rationale for distinguishing real property 
forfeitures from the traditional forfeiture of personal property to enforce the revenue 
laws. The conduct underlying the revenue laws-making income or importing goods---is 
not criminally proscribed, and those engaged in such activities constitute a viable lobby 
if enforcement agents abuse their powers or exact forfeitures without justification. The 
unavailability of political redress separates civil forfeiture under the Drug Act from civil 
forfeiture under the revenue laws. In passing the Drug Act, Congress was not collecting 
taxes that drug dealers might otherwise evade. Congress does not admit to collecting 
revenues from drug trafficking; rather, it expressly intends to punish and deter drug 
traffickers. "It was hoped that through the use of current criminal and civil forfeiture 
provisions, forfeiture would become a powerful weapon in the fight against drug 
trafficking and racketeering." S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., \st Sess. 194 (1983), 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3377. Civil forfeiture for revenue violations is 
part of an escalating scale of penalties, with criminal sanctions reserved for egregious 
cases. The drug laws, by contrast, begin with criminal sanctions. 21 U.S.C. §§ 841-58 
(1994). Civil forfeiture was added to enhance the deterrent value of those criminal 
sanctions. 
241. Alexander v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2766, 2775 (1993). 
131 
have been well within constitutional boundaries. Only when the sanction 
is styled as a civil remedy do disproportionality concerns arise because 
the sanction must be remedial rather than deterrent. Similarly, the due 
process issue raised in Good would not arise under the criminal 
forfeiture provisions242 because those procedures easily pass constitu-
tional muster.243 Of equal importance from society's perspective is the 
reduction of agency costs identified in Part I that occurs when a criminal 
conviction is required. Law enforcement officials would need to 
criminally prosecute an individual to obtain forfeiture revenues, thus 
decreasing their enthusiasm for forfeiture, while simultaneously 
diminishing the risk that prosecutors and officers will maximize revenue 
at the expense of deterrence.244 
E. Excessive Fines Clause 
Once civil forfeiture has been confined to its appropriate domain by 
the Due Process Clause, civil forfeitures will implicate only the Eighth 
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.245 That clause is not limited by 
its terms to criminal punishments, and it lends itself to disproportionality 
concems.246 We agree with the holding in Austin that there are sound 
242. Peter A. Winn, Seizures of Private Property in the War Against Drugs: What 
Process is Due?, 41 SW. L.J. Ill I, l 125 (1988). Winn comments on 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 853(e)(2)(f): 
Id. 
Under the criminal forfeiture procedures the government, in order to seize 
property prior to a criminal conviction, must make three showings: (I) that 
probable cause exists to seize the property; (2) that preseizure notice would 
likely render the property unavailable for forfeiture (i.e., an extraordinary 
situation); and (3) that less restrictive means, such as a bond, restraining order, 
or lis pendens, would not suffice to protect the government's interest. 
243. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989) (upholding 21 U.S.C. 
§ 853(e)). 
244. Cf Stahl, supra note 194, at 335 ( citing study showing "that parallel criminal 
charges are filed in only twenty percent of § 88 l cases"). 
245. See Henning, supra note 157, at 69 ("The only basis on which to judge 
whether a sanction is proportional to the underlying violation is under the Excessive 
Fines Clause."). 
246. See John C. Jeffiies, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, 72 VA. L. REv. 139, 149 (1986) ("[A] nominally civil fine may be every bit 
as 'excessive' as a criminal one and should be equally objectionable. This conclusion 
is reinforced by the significant textual differences between the eighth amendment and 
those Bill of Rights guarantees specifically limited to the criminal context."). There is 
a substantial historical argument that the drafters of the Bill of the Rights sought to 
proscribe only the use of imprisonment conditioned upon the payment of an unrealistic 
fine. See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 267 (1989) 
( discussing events leading to the adoption of Section IO the English Bill of Rights, 
which was adopted verbatim by Art. I, § 9 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, which 
in turn provided the basis for the Eighth Amendment); Brief for the United States, 
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reasons to give broader scope to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition 
against excessive fines than to its prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment. Specifically, the government benefits from forfeiture, while 
imprisonment and related sanctions cost the government when it inflicts 
them.247 From an historical perspective, the use of civil forfeiture 
recalls the English crown's abusive use of "amercements" before they 
were limited by the Magna Charta.248 The government has every 
incentive to prefer fines over criminal actions; if left unchecked, it will 
not hesitate to exact the most draconian sanctions in civil proceedings. 
We disagree, however, with Austin's attempt to identify whether a 
particular forfeiture is remedial or punitive. A case-by-case review for 
excessiveness as applied can only lead to inconsistent treatment of 
similarly situated defendants. The label "punitive" should be reserved 
for sanctions that are traditionally criminal. Where the government 
intends to punish, it plainly can impose a much heavier sanction than it 
can in a civil proceeding: optimal deterrence requires a penalty that is 
a multiple of the harm incurred by society.249 Instead of searching for 
an amorphous equilibrium between the harm caused and the 
government's recovery, we think that the test for excessiveness of a civil 
forfeiture should be grounded in the in rem tradition. Excessiveness 
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801 (1993) (No. 92-6073). This interpretation of 
the of the original purpose of the clause has been disputed. See Calvin R. Massey, The 
Excessive Fines Clause and Punitive Damages: Some Lessons From History, 40 VAND. 
L. REV. 1233, 1240-69 (1987). In any event, the Court has held that all imprisonment 
conditioned on the payment of a fine violates the Equal Protection Clause where the 
defendant cannot realistically pay. See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 399 (1971); 
Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970). The Excessive Fines Clause has thus 
been stripped of its original function by free-ranging interpretation of other constitutional 
provisions. 
247. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2693 n.9 (1991) (Scalia, J.), 
Justice Scalia commented: 
Id. 
There is good reason to be concerned that fines, uniquely of all punishments, 
will be imposed in a measure out of accord with the penal goals of retribution 
and deterrence. Imprisonment, corporal punishment and even capital 
punishment cost a State money; fines are a source of revenue. As we have 
recognized in the context of other constitutional provisions, it makes sense to 
scrutinize governmental action more closely when the State stands to benefit. 
248. See Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 268-73 (discussing history of amerce-
ments); id. at 287-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same). 
249. See POSNER, supra note 30, at 222. 
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should tum on civil forfeiture's rationale-the "guilty property" 
fiction--measured by the fault of the offending property. We agree with 
Justice Scalia that, "[t]he question is not how much the confiscated 
property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a close 
enough relationship to the offense."250 If the object has an obvious 
connection to the illegal act, then, whatever the culpability of its owner, 
the sanction is not "excessive."251 Contraband, guns used in a crime, 
and mislabeled or dangerous goods easily pass such scrutiny. Where the 
object lacks such an obvious connection because it has more than one 
use (e.g., a conveyance in which marijuana is found), the government 
must show that the property has a close nexus to the crime and to the 
historical function of in rem forfeiture. On this test, a vessel used to 
smuggle drugs into the country or goods imported without paying 
customs duties, are plainly forfeitable. Where the property has a less 
obvious connection to the historical function of forfeiture, such as an 
automobile, the relevant question should be whether the car was used to 
facilitate the crime. For example, a car which transported cocaine for 
sale would be forfeitable, regardless of the car's value, while a car in 
which one marijuana cigarette was found would not be forfeitable, again 
regardless of the car's value.252 The appropriate inquiry focuses on the 
instrumentality's fault, not amorphous balancing of harm and remedy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have shown how civil forfeiture leads police and 
prosecutors to excessive enforcement of drug prohibition. The revenues 
available from civil forfeiture have made drug crime a top priority at the 
expense of fighting other crimes. These revenues have also made civil 
forfeiture the preferred crime-fighting weapon against drug crime. That 
weapon, however, is susceptible to abuse, and brings with it increased 
violence and property crime. 
We have also shown how civil forfeiture's potential for abuse 
increased substantially when the Court cut it loose from its moorings in 
enforcing the customs laws. Civil forfeiture was introduced into a 
context where its functional justification--the unavailability of personal 
250. See Austin v. United States, I 13 S. Ct. 2801, 2815 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). See also United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358, 365-66 (4th Cir. 1994) 
(applying instrumentality test for excessiveness). 
251. See Austin, I 13 S. Ct. at 2815 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Scales used to 
measure out unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the 
purest gold or the basest metal."); United States v. Cullen, 979 F.2d. 992, 995 (4th Cir. 
1992) ("[T]he Ferrari is at least as harmful an instrumentality as the Chevette."). 
252. See Clark, supra note 145, at 479. 
134 
[VOL. 33: 79, 1996] Civil Forfeiture 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
jurisdiction over the wrongdoer-largely did not apply. This departure 
from common law traditions led the Court into confusion when it later 
attempted to curb civil forfeiture's abuses. Unwilling to limit the 
government to traditional common law procedures, the Court has 
afforded itself flexibility in its due process analysis. That flexibility, 
however, has carried with it a substantial cost. Having abandoned 
tradition, the Court has found no alternative to confront the patent 
injustices that have accompanied the expansion of civil forfeiture. The 
result has been doctrinal confusion and a mish-mash of ad hoc balancing 
exercises. 
In response to that confusion, we offer an alternative constitutional 
framework grounded in the historical function and practice of civil 
forfeiture. Under our rule, personal property ordinarily could be 
forfeited civilly, but real property forfeiture would require a criminal 
conviction. Our constitutional regime, while remaining true to common 
law tradition, would limit forfeiture's worst abuses by affording property 
owners criminal procedures in those cases which pose the greatest risks 
of disproportionality and erroneous determinations. Moreover, our 
regime would limit those abuses in a principled and predictable rule-
based fashion, rather than relying on ad hoc balancing. As the Court 
plunges ahead in its efforts to rein in forfeiture, we suggest that 
traditional practice, tested by time, may provide the surest guide. 
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